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Abstract
Expeditionary Air Force Civil Engineer support to recent operations in southwest
Asia created a unique organizational learning environment, particularly related
supporting the general engineering requirements of geographically separated units in a
manpower-constrained contingency environment. One of the direct results of this
organizational learning was the hub-and-spoke expeditionary engineer unit featuring
elements of both Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron,
Engineer and Prime Base Emergency Engineer Force capabilities operating with theaterwide visibility of infrastructure requirements. This study acquired insights from literature
and a purposeful sample of subject matter experts about operational advantages this huband-spoke unit offered compared to those offered by strictly legacy organizational
models. The research used a Delphi method of expert opinion elicitation to which of
these may be applicable in future contingency environments with caveats, constraints,
and conditions that CE force planners should consider for hub-and-spoke organizations.
The expert panel demonstrated consensus on 20 advantages and associated success
factors, including resource cross-leveling flexibility, optimized organizational proximity
to key support functions like logistics and contracting, centralized core engineering
functions, and better-defined command relationships in the Joint environment.
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AN ANALYSIS OF FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE SUCCESS OF
EXPEDITIONARY CIVIL ENGINEER HUB-AND-SPOKE ORGANIZATIONS

I. Introduction
Background
Since the 1960s, expeditionary Air Force civil engineer (CE) capabilities have
been presented to combatant commanders (COCOMs) primarily in the form of Prime
Base Emergency Engineer Force (BEEF) and Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy
Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer (RED HORSE) teams (Marlin, 1987). While
these teams are operationally controlled by various levels of an often complex command
structure, local wing commanders have developed an expectation that at least one of these
teams will be assigned to their installation to support their local mission.
Most recently, the Expeditionary Prime BEEF Group (EPBG), Expeditionary
RED HORSE Group (ERHG), and Expeditionary Civil Engineer Group (ECEG)
concepts have been utilized in Air Force Central Command’s (AFCENT) area of
responsibility (AOR) in Southwest Asia (SWA) to present expeditionary CE capability to
supported operations. These units use a hub-and-spoke concept of operation (CONOP) to
fulfill roles and responsibilities related to general contingency engineering. They
primarily support project programming, design, troop labor, and contract construction
management needs generated by Air Force and Joint tactical infrastructure requirements
(Allen, 2009). This CONOP has become the basis for presenting Air Force CE
contingency support capabilities to commanders in the Joint operational community
prosecuting Operations IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF).
1

The operational advantages this CONOP appears to offer to supported commanders have
led CE planners to consider its use in contingency situations in other areas of
responsibility (AORs).
One of the critical factors for success in most military operations is effectively
addressing the challenge of applying the right people to the right place at the right time
(Borofsky & Matecko, 1989). To address this challenge, CE force planners have
primarily utilized two models to develop recommendations for how many and in what
skills mix CE personnel will be required to support a given operation. For the first model,
the Air Force personnel resources functional community maintains the Air Force
Manpower Standard, which is based on expected personnel requirements at a permanent,
enduring operating location. The Air Force Civil Engineer Unit Type Code (UTC) Guide
and CE supplement to the War Mobilization Plan (WMP) form the second model. They
are based on how many personnel may be required to fulfill Air Force infrastructure
requirements in an expeditionary environment. The application of these two models in
the situations for which they were developed has historically produced effective
recommendations for manning levels (Winkler, 2011).
These models assume that Prime BEEF expeditionary CE capabilities remain
primarily aligned with and controlled by local installation commanders. This paradigm
stands in contrast to the one in which hub-and-spoke organized Air Force CE units found
themselves operating in later phases of OEF and OIF. These units were aligned at the
command echelon above wing (or Joint equivalent), often as part of a Joint task force,
with AOR-wide visibility of infrastructure requirements. As of 2013, they featured Prime
BEEF capabilities and the heavy repair and construction capabilities of RED HORSE
2

under one centralized command element. Anecdotal accounts and those summarized in
available after action reports (AARs) suggest that this alignment made it possible to
better manage the utilization of expeditionary CE capability in the AFCENT AOR by
enabling functional commanders to allocate often-limited CE resources to the areas
where these resources will have the greatest impact on the mission.
This research effort supports the CE contingency force planning community, who
is seeking to develop a CE force planning model that capitalizes on operational
advantages SWA hub-and-spoke CE units have appeared to offer supported commanders.
Developing this model requires documenting current CE manpower planning knowledge
developed in the course of applying the hub-and-spoke organizational model to CE units
operating in SWA. Recommendations can then be made for application of appropriate
facets of that knowledge to future operations plans in other AORs. Currently, only an ad
hoc hub-and-spoke manpower model exists. It is limited in its ability to reflect human
resources requirements for constructing, repairing, and maintaining expeditionary
airfields. This research seeks to add to the existing force planning body of knowledge. Its
outcome may act as the theoretical basis upon which further investigative efforts
pertaining to contingency construction labor productivity, manpower planning tools,
expeditionary airbase location optimization, knowledge transfer at deployment rotation
turnover, exercises and evaluations, and others may be based.

Research Objective
This research's objective is to acquire insights and recommendations from
literature and CE functional subject matter experts (SMEs) about factors that influence
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CE hub-and-spoke units' successful delivery of operational advantages to supported
commanders compared to those offered by strictly legacy expeditionary CE
organizational models. It seeks to answer a research question formulated based on
direction from the sponsor, previous research, published literature, and accounts of recent
actions in OEF and OIF. Specifically:
What are factors that influence successful delivery of operational
advantages offered by hub-and-spoke organized expeditionary CE units?
Answering this question requires the consideration of a series of initial investigative
questions:
1. What operational advantages have hub-and-spoke-organized expeditionary CE
units offered for meeting theater-level objectives effectively in SWA?
2. Of the operational advantages determined in Question One, which might be
potentially relevant or applicable to supporting the combined forces air
component commander (CFACC) in another AOR?
3. Of the operational advantages determined in Question One, which might not be
potentially relevant or applicable to supporting the CFACC in another AOR?
4. What factors should be present for CE hub-and-spoke units to successfully
provide these operational advantages to a supported CFACC?
Air Force senior leadership responses to the need to codify the organizational learning the
CE community has experienced in recent SWA operations, commander-in-chief-directed
reevaluation of the national security strategy in the Pacific, and actual and anticipated
personnel resource constraints serve as the impetus for this research objective. It seeks to
codify the organizational knowledge gained through the course of hub-and-spoke
4

operations in SWA and offer recommendations about how this knowledge may be
applied to how expeditionary CE capability is employed in other contexts. It is upon that
basis that future research may be undertaken to develop tools that may more directly
assist CE expeditionary manpower planners.

Methodology
Based on a grounded theory approach, two phases of analysis were used to meet
the research objective. The first phase of analysis documented existing policies on agile
combat support (ACS) force planning, organizational learning and innovation,
Department of Defense (DoD) planning guidance, and available AARs of expeditionary
CE actions in SWA. The goal of this historical analysis phase was to compile current
theories supporting the two models currently used in expeditionary CE force planning.
Gaps in published organizational knowledge were then identified so qualitative data
gathering in the second phase could be appropriately focused.
The second phase of the research more closely examined identified gaps in
published force hub-and-spoke force planning knowledge. This phase utilized a modified
Delphi technique to elicit expert panel opinion. Panelists were queried on their opinions
regarding the operational advantages obtained by organizing expeditionary CE capability
in a hub-and-spoke fashion in SWA. The panel of experts' responses were iterated among
the group to work towards agreement and consensus on an appropriate set of factors
contributing to the success of CE hub-and-spoke units operating in SWA and their
perceived applicability to other theaters. The goal of this phase was to document tacit
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force planning knowledge and establish a theoretical basis upon which future research
can be founded.

Scope, Assumptions, and Limitations
This research effort analyzed contingency CE force planning theories in the
context of recent SWA deployment experiences. It sought to determine factors that made
CE hub-and-spoke successful in SWA and which of them may be applicable to CE huband-spoke units supporting Air Force expeditionary infrastructure requirements in other
AORs. During the course of this research effort, assumptions were required to maintain
appropriate scope and increase the likelihood that meaningful results were produced.
Specifically, the research was based on the following general assumptions:





The material contained in AARs was communicated accurately and provided a
comprehensive overview of the challenges met and issues addressed by CE huband-spoke-organized units
Supported operational commanders in contingency environments will comply
with published Air Force installation infrastructure standards and guidance
That expeditionary CE capabilities will be primarily organized, trained, equipped,
and employed in support of CFACC requirements, with support provided to Joint
infrastructure requirements by exception

As with all expert opinion elicitations, data sourced from human recollection and
communication comes with some bias that cannot be entirely eliminated through
deliberate mitigation measures. Furthermore, potentially available data and informed
opinion pertain to hub-and-spoke operations in SWA almost exclusively. An element of
risk is introduced when attempting to generalize information to new contexts. Other
AORs may introduce conditions or constraints that limit the potential success factors
documented by this research and forecasted to be applicable elsewhere. The project was
6

also limited by the availability of adequate quantitative data to identify and validate other
planning factors to be included in its recommendations.
A formative effort, this research was not without limitations. Data classification,
availability, method of elicitation and analysis, and time constraints presented the greatest
limitations to this research. Only unclassified data were examined in the course of this
study. While additional insight may be gained if classified data is incorporated into
subsequent research efforts, these data would not have necessarily enhanced the utility of
findings at such an early stage of this research stream. Thus, this research explored
general operational advantages and associated unclassified success factors exclusively.
While genuinely well-intentioned and having the prerequisite buy-in required for
participation in the project, one of the primary sources of data - the SME panel experienced ongoing challenges related to its collective ability to conform to the study's
time constraints. Furthermore, applying the Delphi technique to the problem introduced
its own constraints. Literature suggests that for as many projects that have achieved
success conducting a Delphi study, there may be as many that have experienced
unfavorable outcomes. Common reasons for failure often include a combination of the
following (Linstone & Turoff, 2002):






Imposing monitor views and preconceptions of a problem upon the respondent
group by over-specifying the structure of the Delphi and not allowing for
contribution of other perspectives related to the problem.
Assuming that Delphi can be a surrogate for all other human communications in a
given situation.
Poor techniques of summarizing and presenting the group response and ensuring
common interpretations of the evaluation scales utilized in the exercise.
Ignoring and not exploring disagreement so that discouraged dissenters drop out
and an artificial consensus is generated
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Understanding the demanding nature of a Delphi and the fact that the respondents
should be recognized as consultants and properly compensated for their time if the
Delphi is not an integral part of their job function

Literature suggests three additional limitations commonly associated with research using
the Delphi technique to forecast solutions. First, the data produced from a Delphi study
is exclusively qualitative, not evidence-based. Second, there are no universally
recognized standards and guidelines for organizing and conducting a Delphi study
(Keeney, Hasson, & McKenna, 2005). Myriad opinions exist for how to identify panel
members, how many should be utilized given a population, how many phases of
questioning to conduct, the appropriate definition of consensus, how data should be
analyzed and reported, and indicators for appropriate conclusion of a study (Hsu &
Sandford, 2007; Keeney, Hasson, & McKenna, 2005). Internal peer review of appropriate
panel members and consultation with local statistical SMEs was accomplished to address
potential validity concerns introduced by using descriptive statistical techniques.
External time factors introduced the ultimate constraint on how thorough an
investigation could be accomplished. These time factors confirm the third primary
limitation: conducting a Delphi study can be time-consuming. Appropriate time must be
allotted to accomplish initial interviews and design, distribute, collect, analyze, and
record questionnaires. Literature-recommended times to allocate for Delphi studies vary
from 45 days to 16 months (Delbecq, Van de Ven, & Gustafson, 1975; Keeney, Hasson,
& McKenna, 2005; Linstone & Turoff, 2002). While studies can be well planned and
executed, researchers often underestimate the amount of time it takes to gain consensus
(Keeney, Hasson, & McKenna, 2005). Lack of panel participation often requires followup contact by way of reminder e-mails and phone calls, thus adding to the overall time
8

required. Data gathering in this research effort was attempted over major holiday seasons,
through rigorous class schedules, and at a time when the sample population was task
saturated planning courses of action to address unprecedented federal fiscal challenges.
Subsequent phases of follow-up questions or further research on the themes suggested by
this study may be best left to future researchers.
The body of Delphi literature acknowledges the fact that Delphi studies typically
possess limited internal validity (Lynch, 2012). To counter this limitation, Delphi studies
are by their nature designed to utilize the concept of data triangulation inherent in
grounded theory approaches to obtain inputs from multiple sources with the expectation
of convergence. The tendency toward limited internal validity was addressed by
intentionally designing the SME panel such that a representative group of opinions would
be represented. Special consideration was also given to providing an adequate description
of the intended outcomes of the research to the participants and using research colleagues
to provide survey feedback.
Despite its relative advantages, utilizing a Likert scale to gauge a subjects' level of
agreement with given statements introduces potential limitations. Use of the scale to
gauge a respondent's level of agreement with a statement assumes that respondents'
responses refer wholly to the attitude being measured. Participants may agree or disagree
with a given statement for a host of reasons beside the attitude of interest. However, this
research determined that given the formative nature of this topic, the potential advantages
the Likert scale offered outweighed its potential pitfalls, thus making its use most
appropriate.

9

Expert assessments of current and future scenarios are not always free of potential
bias or perfectly objective. Only agile combat support (ACS) SME opinion was solicited
regarding how to replicate the operational advantages that past and present hub-andspoke expeditionary CE units offered to a supported CFACC. Supported commanders
whose missions have the potential to be supported by CE capability organized in a huband-spoke fashion were not canvassed. Thus, an assumption of this research is that the
sample surveyed possess the knowledge required to accurately determine the general
engineering effects required to effectively support a given operation. The validity and
future applicability of this research effort's findings relies on open and honest
communication with supported stakeholders about synchronizing perceived requirements
and resource realities.

Document Preview
This document presents this research effort in 5 main topics: literature review,
research methodology, results, and conclusions. Chapter II presents a historical analysis
and review of relevant literature including a brief history of Air Force CE capability
utilization; a review of the problem and its evolution, statutory guidance, and constraints;
discussion of the importance of knowledge management in high-performing
organizations, and a case for the use of an adapted Delphi technique to elicit expert
opinion. Chapter III presents the methodology used to meet the research objectives.
Chapter IV discusses results and associated analysis used to arrive at them. Chapter V
rounds out the main portion of the document by presenting conclusions and
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recommendations. Appendices are included to provide additional supporting information
and document information sources.
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II. Literature Review
This historical analysis and literature review establishes the basis for how Air
Force civil engineer (CE) capabilities interface with the Air Force’s doctrinal core
function of agile combat support (ACS). In doing so, gaps in published Air Force CErelated force planning knowledge are outlined to provide a basis for the execution of the
research methodology presented in Chapter III. To more fully appreciate the force
planning challenge Air Force CE faces as it prepares to support future operations, the
research must discuss Air Force combat capability presentation and employment,
expeditionary CE capabilities within that context, how CE has historically determined
required manpower levels, how the concepts of organizational learning and knowledge
management shaped CE expeditionary organizational innovation to produce the current
hub-and-spoke concept of operation (CONOP), and the anecdotal suggestions of
advantages realized as a result of its implementation. Finally, a discussion of subject
matter expert (SME) opinion elicitation methods establishes the justification for use of
the Delphi technique to address the identified knowledge management need at hand.

Airpower Presentation and Employment
Air Force force planning is rooted in operational doctrine and the policy
documents, handbooks, and pamphlets that flow from that doctrine. Formulating the
context in which this manpower planning problem exists requires understanding these
publications and the overarching national security strategy directed by the commander-inchief. Continued study of how to present and employ CE capabilities in support of
combat operations more effectively is an operational imperative. Reductions in personnel
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and budget resources as the Air Force continues to evaluate the use of Cold War-era
theater-level, scenario-based force planning factors versus the capabilities-based factors
that define the post-9/11 Department of Defense (DoD) introduce unique and oftendynamic manpower planning constraints.
Understanding the Air Force doctrine that developed from the statutory basis for
its existence requires a brief review of United States defense policy in the past several
decades. The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act formally indicated that each
branch of service (Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps) is responsible for
organizing, training, and equipping forces to support unified combatant commands. A
senior general officer, typically from alternating branches of service, commands each
unified combatant command. They are directly responsible for prosecuting military
operations within its given area of responsibility (AOR). This command structure and
associated responsibilities foster a joint approach to warfighting wherein capabilities
from each branch of service are designed to be leveraged to fulfill missions most
effectively (Goldwater & Nichols, 1986).
The Goldwater-Nichols Act drives current budgetary and resources request
processes. Title 50, United States Code, Section 404a, requires the executive branch to
issue the National Security Strategy (NSS) annually (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011b).
Among other issues of national security concern, it ultimately communicates to
COCOMs those major contingencies they must be prepared to execute to most effectively
support United States foreign policy objectives. Policy documents that the NSS initiates,
including the National Defense Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),
Unified Command Plan, and Guidance for the Employment of the Force, ultimately drive
13

expectations of troop numbers and equipment. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
(JSCP) formally communicates the capabilities that manpower and associated materiel
are expected to provide. Each Service Chief of Staff, COCOM, and other Defense
agencies use the JSCP to develop requirements to accomplish tasks and mission based on
near-term military capabilities. Thus, JSCP implements deliberate planning guidance
(Department of the Air Force, 2006b).
The Air Force developed the Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) construct
within this context. The AEF represents "the Air Force's methodology for organizing,
training, equipping, and sustaining rapidly responsive air and space forces to meet
defense strategy requirements” (Department of the Air Force, 2011b). In short, the Air
Force presents its capabilities to COCOMs by means of the AEF. The doctrinal tenet of
ACS, which is critical to the facilitation of combat airpower projection, is embedded
within the AEF construct. CEs act as an integral part of the synergy that happens between
the transportation, materiel logistics, installation security, maintenance, and human
resources capabilities traditionally considered ACS components (Department of the Air
Force, 2005).

Expeditionary CE Capabilities in Context
Air Force Doctrine Document 3-34, Engineer Operations (Department of the Air
Force, 2011a), states that the CE functional community's primary ACS responsibility is to
“provide, operate, maintain, and protect sustainable installations as weapon system
platforms through engineering and emergency response services across the full mission
spectrum.” This allusion to the full mission spectrum includes a broad range of
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contingencies that CE must be prepared to address. At one end, the potential exists for
operations to be based from installations where the existing facilities are more than
adequate for sustained operations. At the other extreme, supported commanders may
require CE to be a part of the initial seizure of an airfield location and construct the base's
infrastructure from scratch (Department of the Air Force, 2011a). The evolution of this
unique range of capabilities drives how CE organized, trained, and equipped (Department
of the Air Force, 1999).
Air Force expeditionary operations distinguish CE capability in two ways: Rapid
Engineer, Deployable Heavy Repair Squadron, Engineer (RED HORSE) and Prime Base
Emergency Engineer Force (BEEF) teams (Department of the Air Force, 2011a). The
lines of specific task delineation are often blurred, but at their core, they fulfill unique
portions of the CE mission. While so-called low density, high demand resources like
pavement evaluation teams and major command (MAJCOM) staff augmentees also
provide critical support to COCOMs, they make up a relatively small percentage of the
overall number of Air Force CEs postured to support contingencies.
RED HORSE
RED HORSE organizes, trains, and equips its personnel to provide COCOMs
with expeditionary base heavy construction and repair capabilities. These forces are
capable of self-sustaining operations as they execute tasks related to water well drilling,
demolition, quarry operations, concrete and asphalt batch plant operations, paving, and
large expedient base construction. In contingency situations, the combined forces air
component commander (CFACC) of the unified command's area of responsibility (AOR)
to which the capability is attached controls overall RED HORSE direction. This
15

command and control (C2) relationship ensures the highest probability that their unique
capabilities will be utilized in the most effective manner theater-wide. When not directly
supporting an active contingency, these units fall under the command of a Numbered Air
Force (NAF) and fulfill construction and repair projects not necessarily in direct support
of expeditionary operations (Department of the Air Force, 2011a).
Prime BEEF
Personnel aligned with Prime BEEF teams are typically part of a stateside Civil
Engineer Squadron (CES) whose primary responsibility is to maintain the installation to
which they are permanently assigned. These craftspersons and engineers fulfill traditional
home station installation support functions full time, with readiness exercises providing
scenario-specific practice in contingency CE skills (Department of the Air Force, 2011a).
The Prime BEEF concept evolved out of an emerging expeditionary facilities
requirement after World War II, through the Korean War, and into the Southeast Asia
War. An Air Force CE study group meeting in the late 1960s noted the following
(Marlin, 1987):
Problems plaguing [Air Force CE] at this time included the following: 1) AFCE
had no appreciable mobile response capability for contingencies, 2) AFCE lacked
uniformity in the military/civilian mix from base to base, 3) AFCE provided
inadequate career progression for military members, and 4) AFCE had shown
itself improperly aligned to meet several pre-1964 crises.
To meet these challenges and provide COCOMs with more effective infrastructure
support, a former director of Air Force CE noted “the Prime BEEF program was initiated
to provide responsive, compact temporary duty (TDY) Civil Engineering forces of
specific military skills for direct support of short-term combat operations” (Marlin,
1987). These teams primarily perform force beddown and war damage repair tasks at the
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locations to which the flying squadrons they support in wartime deploy. Requirements for
sizes of teams in these situations are typically based on the anticipated facility and
infrastructure needs of all Air Force units – flying and non-flying – at a given deployed
location (Cummings, 1997; Department of the Air Force, 2011b).
In contingency scenarios, an Expeditionary Civil Engineer Squadron (ECES)
CONOP often drives how these teams are organized, commanded, and controlled. They
are designed to provide on-going, general contingency engineering support directly to a
supported wing commander or equivalent. While these units facilitate theater-level
operational objectives through their support to the local operator, they are not
traditionally directly commanded or controlled by the command echelon above the wing
level.
Expeditionary Capabilities Applied
RED HORSE and Prime BEEF teams support four primary categories of
expeditionary bases. The Forward Operating Location (FOL) is an airfield utilized for
short-term contingencies like counter-drug or combat search and rescue (CSAR)
missions. Operational constraints limit FOL infrastructure development to minimum
standards. Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) airfields are primarily supporting tactical,
CSAR, and reconnaissance operations without establishing full support facilities. FOBs
may be used for an extended duration, but they require main operating base support to
sustain combat operations. A Main Operating Base (MOB) is normally occupied by one
or more wings, typically representing 550 or more personnel. These installations are
continuously operated and possess in-place Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) command
structures, robust expeditionary combat support (ECS), and logistics supply functions.
17

Intermediate Staging Bases (ISBs) are locations or airfields used to stage forces prior to
inserting combat forces into the forward theater of operations. These locations have large
transient cargo and personnel requirements and normally require greater planning factors
for cargo ramps and ECS to accommodate robust asset movement. A fifth type of base is
often minimally operated by contracted labor for the purpose of maintaining
prepositioned assets with initial beddown infrastructure. These so-called “warm” bases
may be “heated up” to facilitate rapid deployment of personnel and weapons systems to a
forward expeditionary location (Department of the Air Force, 2006a).
COCOMs issue construction standards for each type of installation as a surrogate
measure of expected contingency operation duration. These standards in turn provide
guidance to force planners calculating manpower recommendations,. These typically fall
into four main categories. The Expeditionary Standard is meant to be in place for up to 90
days. This is the expected life-cycle of a FOL or FOB. The Initial Standard is designed to
be used for up to 6 months and requires a minimum of specialized engineering effort to
sustain operations. Bases to be utilized for up to 24 months are typically built to the
Temporary Standard. Military Construction (MILCON) projects worth in excess of
$750,000 are often programmed and executed to provide this level of infrastructure.
When a base is planned to be utilized for longer than 2 years, it is considered “enduring”
and thus benefits from MILCON-level construction of semi-permanent and permanent
facilities (Department of the Air Force, 2006a).
Core tasks CE units are expected to execute in the course of making any
installation operate at peak effectiveness are organized around in four main areas: 1)
force beddown, 2) airfield damage repair, 3) facilities damage repair, and 4) general
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contingency responsibilities (Department of the Air Force, 2011a). The combat
engineering aspect of military engineering is associated with providing direct support to
the maneuver of land forces. Clearing routes of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and
breaching obstacles are two examples of how combat engineering capability enables
mobility, counter-mobility, and survivability (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011a). Air Force CE
is not organized, trained, or equipped to provide combat engineering capabilities
(Department of the Air Force, 2011a).
While not an all-inclusive list, the following tasks are expected in the course of
force beddown situations (Department of the Air Force, 2011b):













Revetment of unsheltered aircraft
Expanding aircraft parking ramps by laying airfield matting
Constructing earth berms and dikes for fuel bladders or unsheltered aircraft
Modifying existing facilities for alternate use
Erecting bare base facilities and equipment
Installing power generation systems
Installing airfield and installation perimeter lighting
Providing all essential utilities
Constructing earth berms and access roads for bomb dumps
Constructing communication tower foundations
Facility hardening, construction and maintenance of force protection
enhancements
Establishing and maintaining installation contaminated equipment storage,
holding, or disposal areas

Depending on the persistence, abilities, and chance opportunities exploited by human and
natural adversaries, airfield damage repair tasks can vary widely. While historically,
U.S.-held airfields have not experienced catastrophic attack by a determined antagonist
since World War II, Air Force CE maintains the ability to execute wide-ranging rapid
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airfield damage repairs (Department of the Air Force, 2011b). These tasks include
(Department of the Air Force, 2011b):









Identifying unexploded ordnance (UXO) and coordinating disposal
Determining minimum operating strip (MOS) dimensions
Repairing craters and spalls
Assembling and placing foreign object damage (FOD) covers
Performing mechanized FOD sweeping operations
Assembling and placing manufactured load bearing airfield surface matting
Applying airfield markings
Installing and maintaining airfield lighting systems

Facility damage repair tasks are expected to include the application of a wide variety of
expedient construction and repair methods to keep mission-critical facilities operational.
Tasks associated with base recovery after attack include (Department of the Air Force,
2011b):






Assisting with search and rescue efforts
Assessing facility systems damage
Wrecking and demolition
Reporting UXOs and coordinating safing operations
Restoring functionality of facilities, utilities, and equipment

General contingency responsibilities fall into four primary areas: 1) anti-terrorism and
force protection, 2) determination of facility requirements, 3) base master planning, and
4) contracted construction management (Department of the Air Force, 2011a). In addition
to fulfilling these responsibilities in the active phases of contingencies, they are also
applied to pre-conflict operations designed to assist building partner nation capacity in
areas like the Asia-Pacific region (David, 2010; Hoyler, 2010; Rojas, 2011).
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Determining CE Manpower Requirements
Periodically, functional area leaders at the Headquarters Air Force (HAF) level
initiate a comprehensive evaluation to determine the total personnel required to execute
the missions they may be called upon to carry out. This process is known colloquially as
the “Blue Suit Review.” SMEs determine their best recommendation for manpower levels
based on the required CE capabilities given a certain set of scenarios (Department of the
Air Force, 2006b). In the absence of directed guidance specifically outlining the level to
which Air Force capabilities and manpower will be utilized by the Joint operational
community, planners must make educated assumptions based on their own experiences
and on feedback from the field about how many personnel it will take to sustain their
assigned missions (Cummings, 2012).
Contingency CE manpower requirements are most heavily influenced by the
following variables (Cummings, 2012; Department of the Air Force, 2011a; Department
of the Air Force, 2011b):









Wartime workload
Wartime man-hour availability
Continuing requirements (those tasks required to continue base operations)
Climatic factors that may affect man-hour availability
Anticipated tenant, COB, FOL, and/or bare base requirements
The possibility of noncombatant evacuation
How effectively manning/asset attrition is addressed by higher headquarters
The availability of ongoing contracted services

By engaging in a continuous cycle of deliberate contingency planning during peacetime,
COCOMs and supporting entities identify the capabilities required to support a wide
range of operations based on scenarios and threats identified in the JSCP (Department of
the Air Force, 2006a).
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Currently, CE manpower planners use
Equation 1 to produce recommendations for the total CE operations and
engineering personnel required at each installation to support sustainment phase
operations:
Y = 61.42 + 0.05584x
where Y is total CE personnel require and x is weighted floor space.

(1)
Equation 1

The weighted floor space is equal to the total floor space located on the
installation and any outlying areas with a similar standard of living measured in
thousands of square feet (KSF) multiplied by the Base Square Footage Weighting Factor
(BSFWF). The BSFWF is based on labor intensity weights established by real property
codes. Three categories of labor requirements (high, 0.47; average, 0.33; and low, 0.20)
are applied to derive base-specific factors (Department of the Air Force, 2011b).
Minimal published guidance currently exists to guide the determination of CE
hub-and-spoke unit manning requirements. The calculations to determine the hub-andspoke manning level required to present effective general engineering capability to the
supported commander are typically ad hoc. As expected in dynamic contingency
environments, situations unfold where increased manpower and floor space capacity must
be provided on severely abbreviated timelines (Department of the Air Force, 1999). At
these times, supported commanders need a revised method of employing readily surgeable CE capability to seize and hold the initiative. CE manpower planners require a
method of determining whether adopting the use of a hub-and-spoke-type organization
has the highest probability of providing the operational advantages realized in SWA
operations, whether the current organizational model offers the highest probability of
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effective support, or if the widespread implementation of a new hub-and-spoke
organizational CONOP may best meet supported commander objectives.

Origin of the Prime BEEF Hub-and-spoke Organization
The military-political environment in which Operations ENDURING FREEDM
(OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) were undertaken catalyzed a shift in senior military
and Executive Branch civilian approach to Joint operations. A series of Army force
utilization decisions created a severe deficit in its uniformed combat service support
capability (Allen, 2009; Bosworth, 2012). Particularly affected was its general
engineering capability, specifically in the tactical infrastructure planning, design,
construction, maintenance and repair disciplines. When the on-the-ground consequences
of this deficit began to emerge, leaders serving on Joint staffs were challenged to find an
expedient solution. Employing expeditionary Air Force CE capability in direct support of
Army infrastructure requirements was determined to be the ideal Joint warfighting
solution (Bosworth, 2012). Formal requests for forces (RFFs) were issued and Air Force
CE personnel aligned with Prime BEEF unit type codes (UTCs) were deployed on what
initially became known as in-lieu-of (ILO) taskings and then Joint Expeditionary
Taskings (JETs).
Prime BEEF personnel were initially placed under the tactical control (TACON)
of fielded Army brigade combat team (BCT) commanders as one-for-one replacements in
their imbedded utilities detachments (U-Det) and facility engineer teams (FET).
Organizationally, the size and scope of operations characterized by BCTs make them a
rough equivalent to an Air Force wing, typically commanded by a colonel or brigadier
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general. Similarly, the infrastructure support these Air Force CE teams provided to BCT
commanders was analogous to that which they provided Air Force wing commanders
(Allen, 2009; Bosworth, 2012).
Feedback received from supported Army BCT commanders regarding the
effectiveness of employing expeditionary Air Force CE capability in this way was
generally outstanding. However, through several deployment rotations, manpower
challenges associated with aligning Air Force CE capability directly under the control of
an Army brigade commander became apparent. Furthermore, concerns related to
potential undermining of Air Force CEs ability to provide beddown and sustainment of
airpower were raised as Air Force CE capability was flexed to support Joint requirements
(Allen, 2009).
Direct, end-of-tour interview, and after action report (AAR) feedback provided by
Air Force teams attached to BCT command staffs suggested wide disparities in the
workload experienced by teams attached to different BCTs (AFIT CES Faculty, 2010).
No process existed to shift those personnel in one BCT who were not as busy with
mission-critical work to provide workload relief to those teams in a separate BCT who
were task saturated fulfilling mission-critical infrastructure requirements. The same
challenge existed for shifting materials and expertise. Institutional differences in how
supported commanders leverage engineer capability also meant that Air Force CE
personnel were often called upon to perform tasks well outside the general engineering
capabilities they were deployed to provide. Those institutional differences also created
significant challenges and administrative and tactical control over fielded Air Force CE
forces were separated between two branches of service (AFIT CES Faculty, 2010).
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Furthermore, an effective system for providing feedback to pre-deployment training
centers and to planners who might be able to tailor the requests for forces capabilities to
those that met emerging requirements in-theater remained chronically elusive (Frey,
2009). These challenges appeared to compound as Air Force CE operations tempo
(OPSTEMPO) levels increased to unsustainable levels, home station missions began to
be affected, and personnel retention issues were identified (Allen, 2009).
Practitioners and researchers have long-understood that most innovations are the
result of borrowing or building on previous innovation, rather than invention from scratch
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; March & Simon, 1958). This was certainly the case as
functional Air Force CE leaders more intentionally considered the application of
knowledge gained as a result of supporting over 7 years of continuous overseas
contingency operations to the problem of how to best present expeditionary CE
capabilities to their Joint functional partners (Allen, 2009). By 2009, Air Force CE
leadership had successfully made the case for realignment and consolidation of Air Force
CE forces fulfilling general engineering responsibilities in direct support of the Army and
Marines operating in Afghanistan. By design, the command echelon above the BCT level
controlled the newly proposed Expeditionary Prime BEEF Group (EPBG) with the
purpose of supporting regional engineer task forces. Bagram Airfield served as the
headquarters for the EBPG, with squadron headquarters hubs at three major airfields
located around Afghanistan. Spoke teams would then forward deploy to Army and
Marine FOBs to perform general engineering tasks, including light vertical construction;
surveying; life, health, and safety utilities inspections and repairs; base master planning;
minor construction project programming; design; and construction management (Allen,
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2009). Feedback from supported units has served as a proof of concept for the EPBG's
hub-and-spoke style of organization also utilized by RED HORSE units for their service
in SWA (Yolitz, 2009).
A new iteration of the hub-and-spoke-organized expeditionary CE unit concept
emerged in late 2011. Statutory limits, most closely related to boots-on-ground (BOG)
constraints in Afghanistan as part of the so-called surge recovery operations, drove
planners to consider an over-the-horizon approach to providing expeditionary CE
capability. This CONOP stipulated that with the exception of lean contingents of CE
personnel at various installations, expeditionary CE capability would be centrally
commanded and controlled from a major enduring location far to the rear of the primary
action. Resources were provided such that CE personnel would fulfill both Air Force and
Joint infrastructure requirements, often thousands of miles removed.
The newly-formed 1st Expeditionary Civil Engineer Group (ECEG) met this
command and control (C2) and logistics challenge by providing "highly mobile, light and
heavy construction and repair capability throughout the AFCENT area of responsibility
when requirements or threat levels exceed normal civil engineer unit capabilities"
(AFCENT, 2012). It thus unified Prime BEEF and RED HORSE capabilities under one
commander, a colonel, and more closely controlled the prioritization and utilization of
their capabilities. Headquartered at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, and reporting directly to
the AFCENT CFACC, it maintained SWA-wide visibility of infrastructure requirements.
The success experienced by the 1 ECEG suggests that this over-the-horizon hub-andspoke innovation should be considered for implementation in support of contingencies in
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other theaters. However, doing so first requires an examination of the factors contributing
to this success.

Codifying and Applying Observations, Innovations, and Lessons Learned
Through guidance documents like the 2010 QDR and National Security Strategy
of 2012, the current administration has directed active reevaluation of Pacific Command
(PACOM) operations plans (OPLANs) (Gates, 2010; White House, 2012). This strategic
guidance ultimately informs the organizational planning of the aggregate functional
communities that support the execution of those OPLANs. Congressionally-mandated
resource constraints further affect overall manpower authorizations DoD-wide, driving
decision-makers to reevaluate the way in which remaining personnel resources are
employed to support given OPLANs. These decision-makers often look to recent military
organizational and process innovations to inform their recommendations about future
organizing, training, and equipping actions. Characterizing and attempting to replicate the
success factors that gave the supported CFACC the operational advantages that hub-andspoke organized CE units did may provide future commanders with similar operational
advantages. Being aware of the challenges posed by certain circumstances can also
increase the likelihood that these challenges may be effectively identified and overcome
in future contingencies.
Air Force policy regarding the creation and dissemination of new knowledge
takes its formal cues from Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 8260.01, Support
for Strategic Analysis, and DODI 8260.2, Implementation of Data Collection,
Development, and Management for Strategic Analyses. Air Force policy states that AARs

27

are one of the primary means by which observations of successes and challenges can be
collected and lessons learned gleaned. These reports become the published products that
reconstruct specific events or combat operations through the lens of the participants'
firsthand knowledge and experience. One of their primary objectives is to assist Airmen
in the incorporation of knowledge that facilitates more effective and efficient prosecution
of assigned missions. To that end, these reports "describe how the mission could be/was
improved, potential risks to mission degradation, and how to mitigate those risks"
(Department of the Air Force, 2010).
While the successful application of the hub-and-spoke concept to expeditionary
CE operations in SWA has catalyzed discussions of potential courses of action in the Air
Force CE functional community, additional rigor must be applied to more fully distill
lessons learned and their potential application to hub-and-spoke-organized CE units in
future contingencies. Little in the way of published material has been produced
documenting operational knowledge applicable to this problem. A theoretical basis for
operational CE force planning tools required characterization. A knowledge gap existed
that required collection and analysis of qualitative data about the challenges and
successes SWA CE hub-and-spoke-organized units experienced. From these data, it
would be possible to determine factors leading to the success of these units. Data of the
types included in AARs prepared by unit commanders and gleaned from input by a panel
of CE functional SMEs with first-hand experience working with the personnel and
processes involved with the hub-and-spoke concept had to be collected and analyzed.
From these data, a basis could be established for further research into operational tools to
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assist manpower planners considering hub-and-spoke presentation of expeditionary CE
surge capabilities in support of future contingencies.
The AARs produced by recent hub-and-spoke unit commanders capture
observations, innovations, and lessons learned (OILs) developed as a result of Air Force
expeditionary CE capability being organized in a hub-and-spoke fashion in SWA. They
address primarily tactical challenges with some regard to how these may be overcome in
contexts other than those in which the unit operated. Some of these OILs have broader
applicability to hub-and-spoke organization manpower requirements generally. They may
also apply to CE hub-and-spoke organizations supporting CFACCs in other AORs.
Analysis of their content can yield valuable input into how to most effectively organize
expeditionary CE capability. Further canvassing of organizational knowledge held by
those senior leaders who had firsthand experience with both the SWA hub-and-spoke CE
units and other contexts in which this CONOP may be applied has a higher probability of
determining valid recommendations.
Nonaka (2007) argues that the ultimate competitive advantage against an
adversary is knowledge, stating "where the only certainty is uncertainty, the one sure
source of lasting competitive advantage is knowledge." Furthermore, the "secret [of]
success is [a] unique approach to managing the creation of new knowledge” (Nonaka,
1991). Kogut and Zander (1992) present multiple cases where highly successful
organizations whose operations transcend national borders rely on the effective
codification and dissemination of the knowledge gained as a result of a process of
organizational knowledge creation. On this view, effective organizations commit to this
"process of making available and amplifying knowledge created by individuals as well as
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crystallizing and connecting it to an organization’s knowledge system" (Nonaka & von
Krogh, 2009) . Nonaka and von Krogh (2009) further state that in highly dynamic
operational contexts, those organizations who are most consistently successful are those
that "create new knowledge, disseminate it widely throughout the organization, and
quickly embody it" into new ways of executing their mission. Creating new knowledge
often requires "tapping the tacit and often highly subjective insights, intuitions, and
hunches of individual[s] and making those insights available for...use by the
[organization] as a whole." Being highly personal and context-dependent, tacit
knowledge can be difficult to formalize and communicate to others (Nonaka, 2007).
Nevertheless, it is imperative that qualitative data and knowledge be solicited.
Stakeholders must then use that knowledge to move from tacit applications to explicit
ones by providing tools for others in the organization to utilize.
Cantwell and Mudambi (2011) argue that the best way for a large organization
with global reach to maintain and extend its competitive edge is to find a way to
effectively access those with possession of local knowledge. Their research suggests that
the extent to which such a multi-national organization can effectively assimilate new
competencies generated at a tactical level determines how effectively it can leverage
competitive advantages by implementing these competencies more broadly. In their view,
effective organizational knowledge creation paradigms must be established from the top
down so that lessons may be effectively disseminated and applied.
However, Govindarajan and Ramamurti (2011) noted most recently "legacy
internal organizational structure, legacy routines, and cognitive maps may act as barriers"
to organizational knowledge creation and must be addressed in order for effective
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learning to occur. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argue that absorptive capacity (AC) is the
ability of an organization to overcome those barriers to assimilate external information
and apply it to beneficial use. AC becomes a function of prior related knowledge, which
is often required to be intentionally documented and disseminated. Lack of early
investment in expertise like force planning skills among Air Force CE officers may
"foreclose the future development of capability in that area" (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).
Therefore, an evolving theoretical groundwork for force planning and organizational
innovation must be set so the Air Force CE functional community maintains its edge into
the future. A necessary method of laying this groundwork involves the solicitation of
SME opinion and analysis of the content of their responses.

Eliciting Expert Opinion
Numerous non-experimental techniques are available to assist the researcher with
soliciting and analyzing qualitative inputs from a group. The most widely used are
surveys, interviews, and questionnaires. Each method possesses relative strengths and
disadvantages when applied to various contexts.
Surveys are typically used to gather data from a randomly selected population
sample. Researchers then take that sample's responses and attempt to make judgments
about the characteristics or opinions of the population at-large (Krathwohl, 1998). Patton
(2009) notes that participants "are interviewed, questioned, or otherwise observed so that
their attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors as they exist without experimental intervention are
determined." Respondent pools often number over one hundred, the volume of questions
is relatively limited, and there is little opportunity for follow-up or clarifying questions
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(Patten, 2009). While especially appropriate in contexts where questions can be
appropriately designed to collect certain data, a survey of senior CE leader opinion did
not appear appropriate.
Another often-utilized method of qualitative data gathering is the semi-structured
interview. These interactions are typically face-to-face and recorded (Patten, 2009). Time
commitment on the part of both the respondent and researcher is high, especially if
follow-up interview sessions are required to clarify perspective based on subsequent data
gathering (Krathwohl, 1998). While time constraints posed a serious challenge to the use
of interviews for this study, the most significant challenge was the one presented by the
geographical separation of participants.
Use of questionnaires through the application of a Delphi technique appeared to
hold distinct advantages over all other methodologies. While variations exist, the main
concept behind the Delphi technique centers on attempting to facilitate a group
communication process that allows a group of individuals, taken as a whole, to address a
complex problem. It starts with the distribution of an initial questionnaire to members of
a group and inviting them to respond individually. The primary goal of a Delphi study is
to define reality by facilitating interaction (Linstone & Turoff, 2002). It is among the
handful of research methods based on grounded theory, which states that by its nature,
qualitative research tends to apply inductive means of data analysis. Researchers collect
and analyze qualitative inputs and develop theories grounded in those data (Patten, 2009).
Four distinctive features of a typical Delphi study make the definition of reality
possible: anonymity among Delphi participants, iteration, controlled feedback, and
statistical aggregation of group responses (Rowe & Wright, 1999). Whereas surveys tend
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to answer "what is" questions, Delphi studies often attempt to determine "what
could/should be" (Miller, 2001). These characteristics made the Delphi technique wellsuited for the objectives of the SME opinion solicitation required by this research effort.
Furthermore, while other distribution means were available, literature confirms that email communication in the Delphi study can be highly effective. Sheehan and McMillan
(2011) note one advantage on which this research effort sought to capitalize. Specifically,
electronic mail messages tend to have higher response rates over traditional hardcopy
mail. Additionally, they promote faster response times, and respondents typically appear
more willing to reply to open-ended questions.

The Delphi Method
A growing body of research finds that the Delphi method of SME opinion
elicitation can work well in helping investigate incomplete knowledge about a problem or
phenomenon (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). It has the potential to focus group
knowledge on an issue and structure that group's communication in a way that allows that
knowledge to address it. The Delphi technique is also effective at meeting the double
challenge of attempting to forecast requirements years into the future when quantitative
data to do so is minimally existent (Linstone & Turoff, 2002).
After responses to an initial questionnaire have been received from a sample of
participants, they are summarized and sent with a second questionnaire back to the
respondents. This iterative process continues until responses demonstrate stability and
consensus. Evidence from the literature that the Delphi technique can “seek out
information which may generate a consensus on the part of the respondent group” and
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“correlate informed judgments on a topic spanning a wide range of disciplines” confirms
the appropriateness of its use in determining success factors and their potential
applicability in other contexts (Delbecq, Van de Ven, & Gustafson, 1975). Similar timesensitive, qualitative research efforts have confirmed the value of implementing
variations of the Delphi technique to gather and analyze relevant SME opinion (Deason,
2009). Peer-reviewed precedent has been established for the use of the Delphi method of
SME opinion solicitation in cases where a requirement exists to structure group
communication to meet a stated research objective (Linstone & Turoff, 2002). Using the
Delphi technique can be particularly effective at gathering and evaluating opinions held
by heterogeneous groups of experts like those who maintain the largely tacit body of huband-spoke CE manpower planning knowledge (Rowe & Wright, 1999).
Use of a Delphi technique to solicit and analyze subject matter expert opinion
presents the possibility of other, more practical advantages. Participants in a study guided
by the Delphi technique are not required to be geographically co-located. The ability of
panel members to be physically separated yet still provide meaningful inputs offers a
particular advantage to this research since multiple time zones separate the SMEs most
qualified to participate in this study. By utilizing iterative questionnaires, the Delphi
technique makes it possible to elicit opinion that is relatively free from influence from
other participants, thus protecting against bias and maximizing the probability that honest
opinions will be shared. The time required for inputs to be received and analyzed can be
abbreviated compared to focus groups and interviews by allowing participants to respond
on their own time in a semi-asynchronous manner (Linstone & Turoff, 2002; Rowe &
Wright, 2001).
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Rowe and Wright (1999) first argue that an effective Delphi study must use
experts who possess the appropriate domain knowledge. In addition to adequately
informing the sharing of their opinions in the initial round of questions, having the
appropriate expertise also ensures they are appropriately influenced, or not influenced, by
other panelists' opinions. This study's intent was to follow four guidelines for selecting
SME panel members. These included: 1) knowledge and experience with the issues under
investigation, 2) capacity and willingness to participate, 3) sufficient time to participate,
and 4) effective communication skills (Adler & Ziglio, 2002; Skulmoski, Hartman, &
Krahn, 2007).
Reliance on qualitative expert opinion as the primary basis for establishing a
theoretical framework has its drawbacks. However, when appropriate guidelines are
followed, Delphi studies have a proven track record of producing meaningful results.
Rowe and Wright (2001) outline several key principles to consider when designing and
executing a Delphi study. Several specific Delphi technique considerations were
addressed in the design of this study in an attempt to avoid common challenges
experienced in similar research efforts. They were related to question formulation,
sample size, number of rounds expected to reach consensus, and mode of interaction.
The first negative tendency of some efforts is to query the SME panel with
questions that subsequently prove to be too broad. The knowledge characteristics that
make certain SMEs good candidates for participation are the very reason these SMEs are
often heavily saturated with regular work tasks. Thus, individual panel members may
have only a limited amount of quality time to devote to responding to questionnaires. The
task of analyzing the resulting glut of unfocused perspectives becomes time consuming
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for the researcher as well and introduces a risk of overlooking critical insights
(Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). This challenge can be addressed by focusing the
initial questions, limiting their number, and providing sufficient background information
about the study's premise and potential benefits to motivate focused responses.
Consideration must also be given to sample size in the formation of the Delphi
SME panel. Literature suggests a wide range of potentially valid opinion sample sizes,
with a general increase in decision quality and reduction in error as sample sizes increase.
However, large groups tend to compound challenges related to data collection, analytic
complexity, reaching consensus, and verifying results (Linstone & Turoff, 2002;
Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). This dilemma was moderated by the fact that the
participation commitment was obtained from a high percentage of those holding salient
knowledge regarding recent expeditionary CE organizational innovations. It would be
inappropriate to argue that this study is a census of all those who may have an informed
opinion on the nature of past expeditionary CE hub-and-spoke operations and potential
future innovation. However, a large enough segment of CE senior leaders was
communicated with during the scoping phase of the research that it is probable that an
appropriate number of participants were canvassed.

Literature Review Summary
This chapter provided the statutory and theoretical bases for this research effort. It
outlined the laws and policies that direct the support relationships between the
MAJCOMs and unified combatant commands. Following this strategic level overview
was a discussion of how the Air Force organizes, trains, and equips its own forces to
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support the COCOM, including how Air Force CE capabilities are employed within this
context and how the CE functional community determines overall manpower
requirements. The latest iteration of expeditionary CE capabilities presentation in the
form of the ECEG hub-and-spoke was followed by an argument for how to best codify
and apply applicable OILs to a hub-and-spoke model fulfilling future contingency
requirements. Chapter III presents how the Delphi technique was adapted for use by this
research.
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III. Methodology
This research effort used grounded theory, specifically utilizing the Delphi
method, to gather and analyze qualitative data regarding Air Force expeditionary CE
manpower planning. This was accomplished by eliciting opinions of CE functional SMEs
while considering two primary constraints: 1) the need for utilizing a systematic process
featuring proven methods of qualitative data analysis and 2) accounting for the time
constraints introduced by both the expert panel members and the research project itself. A
two-phase qualitative investigation undertaken using the Delphi technique provided the
most effective means of soliciting SME opinion by possessing the highest perceived
likelihood of yielding meaningful data.

Delphi Study Design
A purposeful sample of SMEs was assembled before initiating the formal steps of
the Delphi study. Selecting the appropriate mix of SME panel members is a critical
component of the application of the Delphi technique since it is upon these panel
members' expert opinions that the output of the research is based (Skulmoski, Hartman,
& Krahn, 2007). Hsu and Sandford (2002) further argue “choosing the appropriate
subjects is the most important step in the entire process because it directly relates to the
quality of the results generated.” While the literature suggests that successful panel
selection is essential to generating valid Delphi study results, little in the way of standard
criteria for SME selection has been published. However, a list proposed by Skulmoski et
al. (2007) and augmented by Scheele (2002) appeared to offer an appropriate list of
credentials for this effort. Specifically, participants should meet the following six
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requirements to be considered a SME (Linstone & Turoff, 2002; Skulmoski, Hartman, &
Krahn, 2007) :







Knowledge and experience with the issue under investigation
Capacity and willingness to participate
Sufficient time to participate in the study
Effective communication skills
Those who are or will be directly affected
Those who have skills in clarifying, organizing, synthesizing, stimulating

The research approached potential participants who had previously served or were
currently serving in key CE manpower planning or command positions directly
associated with both CE hub-and-spoke-organized units in SWA and those units whose
organizational disposition represented more traditional, or legacy, organizational
alignments. Additionally, those who possessed Headquarters Air Force-level operational
perspectives were also desired. Only SMEs from within the CE functional community
were sought out due to time constraints and the complexity of logistics associated with
tracking down and eliciting the opinions of supported commanders.
The true population size of those holding the requisite perspective on
expeditionary CE hub-and-spoke cannot be stated with absolute certainty. However,
discussions with key research stakeholders indicated that approximately 20 individuals
likely held the corporate knowledge required to produce meaningful research data. This
population primarily consisted of Active Duty and Reserve commissioned officers in the
grades of O-5 and O-6 each with over 20 years of military service, primarily in the CE
career field. Also included in this population were select Active Duty senior noncommissioned officers and civilians who had recently retired. According to the latest
guidance published by the Air Force Personnel Center, individuals in these grades have
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typically served multiple tours in support of Joint and multinational military operations,
at the local installation level, MAJCOM staffs, Air Force Headquarters, and others (Air
Force Personnel Center, 2010). The panel thus acted as "stakeholders, those who are or
will be directly affected; experts, those who have an applicable specialty or relevant
experience; and facilitators, those who have skills in clarifying, organizing, synthesizing,
stimulating” (Linstone & Turoff, 2002). Of these, a sample of nine was selected to
participate in the study, primarily due to the availability of respondents, perceived level
of commitment, and ability to respond within the requested timeframes. The Delphi study
proceeded once this purposeful sample was established.
The literature suggests that two to ten iterations of questionnaire distribution,
response, analysis, and verification may be necessary to assist a Delphi research panel in
reaching consensus (Delbecq, Van de Ven, & Gustafson, 1975). During each phase,
respondents are given the opportunity to see the distilled results, provide feedback, and
rate their agreement with them. This research adapted the steps summarized in Table 1
from the work of Delbecq (1975) and Whittington (2012) and used them as the
framework for the Delphi study. They assumed a three-questionnaire format while this
research only used two.
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Table 1. Delphi Study Steps
Step
1
2
3
4
5

Description
The researcher develops an initial questionnaire and distributes it to the panel.
Panelists independently generate answers for the questionnaire and electronically
return it to the facilitator.
The researcher summarizes the responses to the Phase One questionnaire, and
drafts and distributes a follow-up questionnaire for the SME panel.
Referencing the distributed questionnaire, panelists accomplish requested tasks
The facilitator summarizes the responses to the Phase Two questionnaire and
develops a final summary report.
Step One initiates Phase One and begins with an open-ended questionnaire that

seeks to solicit specific information about a content area from the SME panel (Hsu &
Sandford, 2007). The initial questions for this research attempted to offer an opportunity
to brainstorm without requiring more than 20 to 25 minutes of response time. This was
accomplished by not initially requesting opinions about organizational success factors,
but opinions about broader operational advantages that panelists perceived hub-andspoke CE units operating in southwest Asia (SWA) offered to supported commanders.
Panelists were also asked to offer their opinions about which of these advantages could
be replicated in other operational environments and which could not. Justifications for
their opinions were also requested. Follow-up queries would then offer an opportunity to
explore each operational advantage and associated success factors.
The questions were then tested on AFIT student colleagues not involved in the
questionnaire's design in an attempt to enhance their clarity and ensure responses would
be appropriately focused. Once they were reviewed in this way internally, the
questionnaire, researcher credentials, and proposed disclaimer documentation were
reviewed by the AFIT Institutional Review Board (IRB). The IRB granted the Phase One

41

questionnaire an exemption from human experimentation requirements stipulated by 32
CFR 219, DoDD 3216.2, and AFI 40-402, on 19 November 2012. Appendix contains the
exemption notice. This study qualified for an exemption since no sensitive data was
collected and respondent anonymity was maintained. As outlined in Step Two, the
questionnaire was distributed via e-mail to the SME panel members.
Step Three initiates Phase Two. Results of the Phase One questionnaire are
analyzed within the context of the research question, associated literature review, and
general knowledge of the SME backgrounds. Given the diverse perspectives each of the
panel members offered and the small sample size itself, it was determined that all
respondents’ inputs would receive the same weight during the course of this analysis. The
facilitator categorizes the inputs and requests that each panel member rate the degree to
which they agree or disagree with the themes suggested by the panel's answers to the
Phase One questionnaire. The panelists also review their Phase One responses to ensure
their opinions were accurately captured, adjust answers upon review of other panel
member responses, and provide additional feedback or qualifiers. In this analysis, they
were asked to numerically rate the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with each
theme using a five-point Likert-style scale where 5 = Strongly Agree, 4 = Agree, 3 =
Neutral, 2 = Disagree, and 1 = Strongly Disagree. Precedent exists that proves the Likert
scale's ease of producing data to which descriptive statistics may be applied to determine
measures of central tendency (Carifio & Perla, 2007; Linstone & Turoff, 2002).
Additionally, the scale is a “quick, easy to comprehend, and psychologically comforting"
method of eliciting follow-up SME opinion (Linstone & Turoff, 2002). As presented in
Step Four, panelists review initial panel responses and refine, retract, or expand their
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previous answers based on their perception of the group's responses. Additionally, they
typically “rate...items based off the responses to the first questionnaire in order to
establish preliminary priorities among items” (Hsu & Sandford, 2007).
Step Five initiates the final phase of the Delphi study with the analysis of the
follow-up questionnaire using descriptive statistics. For this study, the researcher
determined consensus and stability by statistical analysis of the Likert scale responses.
Hsu and Sandford (2007) provided a framework in which to accomplish this analysis by
noting “the major statistics used in Delphi studies are measures of central tendency...and
level of dispersion...in order to present information concerning the collective judgments
of respondents.” Inferential statistical techniques could not be used due to the unknown
distribution of response values exhibited by such a small sample size and the grounded,
inductive nature of the project.
Keeney et al. (2005) confirm that the Delphi body of literature does not present a
standardized method for determining consensus. However, guidelines exist to assist in the
determination of when consensus has been reached. Typically, the research must use
descriptive statistical tools like histograms, mean, median, or mode, and qualitative
descriptions of the response data to present outcomes (Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, &
Wasserman, 1996). A significant body of literature suggests that the median is a favored
measure of central tendency in Delphi studies utilizing a Likert Scale to measure degree
of agreement (Eckman, 1983; Hill & Fowles, 1975; Hsu & Sandford, 2007). This is
primarily due to the median's ability to moderate extreme answers. Depiction of the
histogram produced by panel member responses also provides a means of gauging the
level of consensus among the panelists. Neither standard deviation nor interquartile range
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values were calculated due to the low sample size and subsequent inappropriateness of
assuming any normality in response. It was thus determined that only the median scores
and response histograms for each theme would be used to indicate degree of consensus.
Step Five concludes with the researcher summarizing the results and offering
potential conclusions, thereby facilitating a sense of closure for the panelists and setting
an expectation for potential future steps. The literature suggests that attempting to
distribute more than three phases of questionnaires may fatigue participants, potentially
diminishing both the quality and quantity of results (Sumison, 1998). Though consensus
was reached on the majority of themes of primary interest, this research may have
benefitted from an additional phase of queries to solidify consensus on items labeled
"Special Interest" in Chapter IV. However, time constraints of both the research itself and
panel members' personal schedules also made this temporally untenable.

Methodology Summary
This chapter provided the theoretical basis for gathering and analyzing the
qualitative data required to explore the use of the hub-and-spoke organizational concept
in SWA and its potential application to future contingencies. It discussed the
appropriateness of Delphi Technique to solicit salient SME opinion on the nuances of
how hub-and-spoke-organized units were designed and operated in OEF and OIF.
Analysis and results of this methodology’s effectiveness at meeting research objectives
are summarized in Chapter Four.
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IV. Analysis and Results
This chapter summarizes the data obtained by applying the methodology
previously outlined and analyzing these data accordingly. Four primary areas are
presented: how the Delphi technique was applied, the associated qualitative results of the
Phase One questionnaire, the development of the Phase Two questionnaire, and statistical
results of the follow-up questionnaire. Table 2 summarizes participation levels in each
phase. It demonstrates that one of the limitations of this study is that it experienced both
informed and latent attrition. Two of the invited participants from Phase One did not
make themselves available for the follow-up questionnaire, reducing the total invited
count by two. One of the panel members who had participated in Phase One simply
became task saturated in the course of Phase Two and was unable to continue
participation in the study.
Table 2. Summary of Participation
Phase
1
2

# Invited to
Participate
11
9

# Participated
7
6

Overall
Participation:

Participation Rate
(%)
64%
67%
65.5%

Delphi Study Application
Step One
The research questions were developed in consultation with the faculty research
committee with the intent of providing an opportunity to present opinions about the
operational advantages CE hub-and-spoke units provided in SWA. They further solicited
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panel member opinion about how which of these advantages may be applicable in other
AORs and which of them may not. While summarized here,
Appendix presents the full questionnaire:
1) What operational advantages do you perceive hub-and-spoke-organized
expeditionary CE units offered for meeting theater-level objectives effectively
in SWA?
2) For the advantages you would identify as potentially relevant/applicable to
supporting the CFACC in another AOR, why would they be relevant?
3) For the advantages you would identify as NOT as potentially
relevant/applicable to supporting the CFACC in another AOR, why would they
not be relevant?
Upon confirmation from a panel of AFIT colleagues that it appeared appropriately clear,
concise, and effective in soliciting initial panel responses, the initial questionnaire was
distributed by e-mail to the SME panel.
Step Two
Ten duty days were allotted for the Phase One questionnaire to be completed by
the panel. Of the questionnaires distributed, seven of eleven were ultimately returned,
resulting in an 64% response rate. While this return rate was significantly less than
anticipated, the sample of responsive panel members still represented a high percentage
of the expected population. The low turnout did not change the underlying assumption
that only descriptive statistical techniques could be used to present measures of central
tendency and consensus. Furthermore, the literature review and pilot discussions with
senior leaders possessing a depth of knowledge with CE hub-and-spoke organizations but
who were not participating in the study acted as an informal validation data set for SME
panel member responses. If questionnaire response data deviated significantly from the
initial data gathered from literature and the others, the low response rate would have been
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further addressed and an alternate course of research action pursued. Thus, the decision
was made to proceed as initially planned.
Step Three
The content of the questionnaire responses was analyzed, major themes
summarized, and the results incorporated into a follow-up Delphi questionnaire. The
response data suggested that hub-and-spoke-organized CE units can offer three primary
operational advantages to supported commanders compared to exclusively traditional
organizational alignments. These advantages appeared to be most closely related to
providing the supported combatant commander an improved ability to leverage general
and geospatial engineering capability within the context of the core doctrinal tenets of
unity of command, flexibility, versatility, and mass effects outlined in AFDD 3-34,
Engineer Operations. These suggested advantages included enhancements in the
following.
1. Command and control effectiveness, defined as effectively ensuring the right
personnel are doing the right mission tasks fulfilling the requirements that
most-impact the supported operational mission.
2. Responsiveness to supported commander, defined as providing a means of
having appropriate flexibility to shift mass effects of CE capability as required
to meet mission requirements and ensuring those effects are massed on the
requirements that will have the greatest effect on the mission.
3. Combat readiness of assigned personnel, defined as personnel being
appropriately trained and equipped to prosecute assigned duties/tasks
effectively.
The SME responses also suggested various factors, the absence of which would likely have had a
particularly negative effect on the delivery of the suggested operational advantages. Table 3, Table
4, and

Table 5 present the three operational advantages suggested by the responses to Question
One and associated potential factors for success. The total frequency of responses
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supporting each suggested advantage is the sum of individual success factor themes
associated with each suggested advantage.
Table 3. Potential Operational Advantage 1 and Supporting Responses
Advantage
Enhanced command and control effectiveness
Factors for Success
Ability to 'cross-level' personnel resources within group ensured appropriate
concentration of mass at the most opportune locations
Ability to cross-level and tailor manpower, equipment, and material mixes to
each specific requirement/task
Clearly communicated and utilized TACON, OPCON, and ADCON relationships
Adhere to centralized control/decentralized execution concept by
establishing/preserving vital tactical-level relationships while ensuring tactical
capability is surged in the most effective way to support theater-level operational
objectives
Ensure local installation personnel footprint remains lean, facilitating effective
boots-on-ground (BOG) numbers management - local unit sheds requirement to
have a large or frequently expanding/contracting permanent party manpower
numbers to support
Request-for-forces (RFF) personnel are not attached to the original requesting
unit regardless of whether the need remains for them - reduces the need to
augment local ECES organization directly with RFF or TDY forces
Blue-on-Blue ADCON ensures Airman are taken care of in a way that will best
facilitate future career development
Maintain lean manpower and process overhead by centralizing core engineering
functions (ie, planning, programming, design) - eliminates redundancy and
facilitates more shovel-and-pick operations
Retain ability to communicate about and maintain accountability for RFF'd
capabilities - ensures ability to rapidly vet emerging requirements that may
require a supported unit to submit a RFF by determining if need can be met by
simply standing up a spoke'd team to address the requirement
Centralize project tasking and command authority
Ensure support/supported force relationships are delineated (especially to Joint
partners) - provides a clear organizational context in which to work
Increased flexibility in personnel waivers due to deeper 'bench' when hub-andspoke unit is group-sized
Ability to communicate observations, innovations, and lessons learned across intheater functional community through the use of various update tools - one O-6
commander improves the chances that lessons learned and other 'news' is
synthesized and disseminated as appropriate
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Frequency
36
6
6
5
4

3

2
2
2

2
1
1
1
1

Table 4. Potential Operational Advantage 2 and Supporting Responses
Advantage
Improved responsiveness to supported commander
Factor for Success
Effective project prioritization through an 'asset management' approach to
theater infrastructure requirements
Efficient materials handling and personnel movement logistics
Theater-wide visibility of requirements and ability to press the supported
commander for his/her priorities - ensures the right capability is being applied in
the right way at the right time (or as close to it as possible)
Theater-wide visibility of requirements and ability to press the supported
commander for his/her priorities - ensures the right capability is being applied in
the right way at the right time (or as close to it as possible)
Smooth interoperability with other higher echelons of agile combat support
(ACS) functionals (ie, Contracting, Comm, Logistics, Finance, etc) - being a
theater level asset, rather than a local CE squadron, enhances this potential
Contracting, finance, and supply personnel organic to the unit - provides another
option for procurement of Class IV and others, potentially shortening lead times
when local contracting and civil augmentation program (CAP) contracts are
overwhelmed or are otherwise experiencing diminished effectiveness
Standardized/templated design/planning products and tactics, techniques and
procedures (TTPs) for various core tasks - reduces delivery time, improves
quality, and boosts safety
Provide ability to stand up and stand down a capability quickly - reduces
requirement for local unit to have to vet a need through RFF process
Hub-managed material yards - provides potentially more expedient
construction/repair material requirements and movement procurement option,
reducing the need for local installations to work these issues
Theater-level visibility of requirements ensures theater-level prioritization of
support as needed to fulfill strategic/operational objectives
Reduce wing (or Joint equivalent) level frivolous contention over infrastructure
requirements and ownership of engineer capability
Optimized organizational proximity to CFACC air mobility division (AMD) helps prioritize transportation
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Frequency
28
5
4
4
3
3

3

1
1
1
1
1
1

Table 5. Potential Operational Advantage 3 and Supporting Responses
Advantage

Frequency
6

Enhanced combat readiness
Factor for Success
Train with those with whom personnel will 'fight'
Standardized pre-deployment training and equipping - a unified streamlined
feedback voice, particularly in Joint training environments, helps focus training
and equipping efforts on most relevant needs
Elements of self-sustainment - hub-and-spoke units do not have to rely solely on
resources procured locally or from supported unit for work, movement, or force
sustainment requirements
Some units had physician and religious support team (RST) support - provided
timely personnel support as needed and ensured focus on mission

2
2
1
1

Content analysis of the responses to Questions Two and Three suggested that
there may be general agreement that most of the operational advantages offered by SWA
hub-and-spoke organized CE units may be replicated in other AORs. However, the
responses suggested a number of caveats, conditions, and constraints that senior leaders
and planning staffs should consider when making future CE hub-and-spoke force
planning and organizational recommendations. Table 6 presents the number of responses
that suggested that all or most of the operational advantages may be relevant in another
AOR, along with the caveats, conditions and constraints offered simultaneously.
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Table 6. Response Summary to Initial Questionnaire, Questions 2 and 3
Category
All operational advantages previously suggested are potentially relevant to huband-spoke-organized CE units supporting the CFACC in another AOR
Caveats/Conditions/Constraints
There is limited evidence for a proof of concept for using hub-and-spokeorganized CE units in Phase 1/2 combat operations where active beddowns are
on-going and infrastructure and materials procurement lines are not robust
The challenge of inter/intra-theater movement (air, ground, or sea-borne) must be
addressed by planners determining required manning levels and associated
equipment and materials requirements
It is critical that consideration be given to siting resources so that extreme
distances or "islanding" of resources that could provide a means of selfsustainment, if co-located, is avoided
Consideration must be made for how the possibility of future coalition
collaboration situations may affect hub-and-spoke manpower levels, disposition,
and training requirements - prime power and other support equipment could
introduce redundancies; falling in on foreign electrical infrastructure may impose
serious operational constraints
Must have a pool of 'good' troop labor projects, especially when they are
standing by to execute more appropriate emergency/surge tasks
Planners must be aware that the advantage of being able to flex personnel from
one squadron to another can be tempered when some squadrons are TACON to
another HHQ within the JTF
Planners must be aware that the advantage of being able to flex personnel from
one squadron to another can be tempered when some squadrons are TACON to
another HHQ within the JTF
Allowance must be given for loss in procurement effectiveness if policy dictates
all procurement be accomplished centrally -consideration must be given to
materials/equipment that can be more effectively/efficiently procured locally
Planners should fully consider for boots-on-ground (BOG) constraints as these
may mitigate some of the potential operational advantages that hub-and-spoke
organized units may offer
Air Force corporate culture challenge of local WG/CCs' expectation of owning
their own robust CE capability (ie, "one base, one boss") must be addressed and
the impact of no organic physician and/or RST support within a hub-and-spokeorganized CE group must be fully considered

Frequency
6
13 (total)
2
2
2

1

1
1
1
1
1

1

Some respondents also offered additional comments related to potential future
innovations of expeditionary CE hub-and-spoke organized units. The implication
suggested was that CE decision-makers and planning staff personnel should consider
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these additional recommendations when organizing future CE hub-and-spoke units. Table
7 summarizes these response data.
Table 7. Suggested Future Planning Considerations
Category
Hub-and-spoke-organized CE units should be considered for support to
contingency exercises and exercise-related construction requirements
When hub-and-spoke unit is leveraging both Prime BEEF and RED HORSE
capabilities, it would be best to ensure the group commander (usually an O-6)
has had operational RH experience prior to assuming command of the group

Frequency
1
1

To provide formal feedback to the facilitator, participants were asked to review
this summary and rate their level of agreement on the five-point Likert scale discussed in
Chapter Three. The scale was as follows: 5=Strongly Agree, 4=Agree, 3=Neutral,
2=Disagree, 1=Strongly Disagree. Included at Appendix is the follow-up questionnaire
distributed to the SME panel upon review and pretest by AFIT colleagues and the
research committee.
Step Four
Thirteen working days were allotted for the Phase Two questionnaire to be
completed by the panel. Two of the invited first round panelists were unresponsive so
they did not receive the follow-up questionnaire. Thus nine follow-up questionnaires
were distributed, six of which were returned, resulting in a 67% response rate. Despite
the low response rate, similar rationale to that which was applied in Step Two's decision
to continue the study applied in Step Four.
Step Five
Using the framework outlined in Chapter III, content and statistical analyses were
conducted on the Phase Two follow-up questionnaire responses. Statistical measures of
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central tendency were calculated in Microsoft Excel using the median scores and
histogram representation of each responses to each suggested theme. Table 8 Table 13 summarize these findings, with themes listed in the order in which
responses were requested. Included at the top of each table are the original directions to
respondents.
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Table 8. Follow-up Questionnaire, Question One Response Data
Questionnaire Directions: Please review and rate your agreement with the following
operational advantages that respondents perceived hub-and-spoke-organized
expeditionary CE units offered for meeting theater-level objectives effectively in SWA.
Question and Statistical Information
Enhanced command and control
effectiveness
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 5
 Overall group sense: Agree

Response Distribution

Improved responsiveness to supported
commander
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 5
 Overall group sense: Strongly Agree

Enhanced combat readiness of assigned
personnel
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 3.5
 Overall group sense: Generally agree

Question Two featured three sub-parts. The questionnaire noted that for each
operational advantage suggested by responses to Question One, panel member responses
indicated the potential for numerous success factors required for the existence of the
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suggested operational advantages. They were then asked to review and rate the degree to
which they agreed that the each factor contributed the successful deliver of each
operational advantage. Table 9, Table 10, Table 11, Table 12, and
Table 13 summarize the resulting responses.
Table 9. Follow-up Questionnaire, Question 2a Response Data
Associated operational advantage: Enhanced command and control effectiveness, defined
as effectively ensuring the right personnel are doing the right mission tasks fulfilling the
requirements that most-impact the supported operational mission
Question and Statistical Information
Empowerment to freely re-appropriate (or
cross-level) CE resources within the group to
ensure appropriate concentration of mass at
the most opportune locations
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 5
 Overall group sense: Strongly Agree

Response Distribution

Ability to cross-level and tailor manpower,
equipment, and material mixes to each
specific requirement/task
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 5
 Overall group sense: Strongly Agree
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Question and Statistical Information
Clearly communicated and utilized TACON,
OPCON, and ADCON relationships
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 4.5
 Overall group sense: Agree

Response Distribution

Adhere to centralized control-decentralized
execution concept by establishing/preserving
vital tactical-level relationships while
ensuring tactical capability is surged most
effectively to support theater operational
objectives
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 5
 Overall group sense: Agree

Ensure local installation personnel footprint
remains lean, facilitating effective boots-onground (BOG) numbers management - local
unit sheds requirement to have frequently
permanent party manpower to support
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 4
 Overall group sense: Agree

Request-for-forces (RFF) personnel are not
attached to the original requesting unit
regardless of whether the need remains for
them - reduces the need to augment local
ECES organization directly with RFF or
TDY forces
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 3
 Overall group sense: Inconclusive
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Question and Statistical Information
Blue-on-Blue ADCON ensures Airman are
taken care of in a way that will best facilitate
future career development
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 4
 Overall group sense: Bimodal/Agree

Response Distribution

Maintain lean manpower and process
overhead by centralizing core engineering
functions - eliminates redundancy and
facilitates more shovel-and-pick operations
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 5
 Overall group sense: Agree

Retain ability to communicate about and
maintain accountability for RFF'd
capabilities - ensures ability to vet
requirements that may require a supported
unit to submit a RFF vs simply standing up a
spoke'd team to address the requirement
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 5
 Overall group sense: Agree

Centralize project tasking and command
authority
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 5
 Overall group sense: Agree
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Question and Statistical Information
Ensure support/supported force relationships
are delineated (especially to Joint partners) provides a clear organizational context in
which to work
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 4.5
 Overall group sense: Agree

Response Distribution

Increased flexibility in personnel waivers due
to deeper 'bench' when hub-and-spoke unit is
group-sized
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 4
 Overall group sense: Agree

Ability to communicate observations,
innovations, and lessons learned across intheater functional community through the use
of various update tools - one O-6 commander
improves the chances that lessons learned
and other 'news' is synthesized and
disseminated as appropriate
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 4
 Overall group sense: Agree
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Table 10. Follow-up Questionnaire, Question 2b Response Data

Associated operational advantage: Improved responsiveness to supported commander, defined as
providing a means of having appropriate flexibility to shift mass effects of CE capability as
required to meet mission requirements and ensuring those effects are massed on the requirements
that will have the greatest effect on the mission.
Question and Statistical Information
Response Distribution
Effective project prioritization through an
'asset management' approach to theater
infrastructure requirements
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 4.5
 Overall group sense: Agree

Efficient materials handling and personnel
movement logistics
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 4.5
 Overall group sense: Agree

Theater-wide visibility of requirements and
ability to press the supported commander for
his/her priorities - ensures the right capability
is being applied in the right way at the right
time (or as close to it as possible)
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 5
 Overall group sense: Agree
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Question and Statistical Information
Effectively address scope creep - when a
spoke'd team comes in to address an
infrastructure requirement, it is apparent
they are not a permanent presence that can be
tasked with additional work without
appropriate vetting
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 5
 Overall group sense: Agree

Response Distribution

Smooth interoperability with other higher
echelons of agile combat support (ACS)
functionals (ie, Contracting, Comm,
Logistics, Finance, etc) - being a theater level
asset, rather than a local CE squadron,
enhances this potential
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 5
 Overall group sense: Agree
Contracting, finance, and supply personnel
organic to the unit - provides another option
for procurement of Class IV, potentially
shortening lead times when local contracting
and CAP) are experiencing diminished
effectiveness
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 5
 Overall group sense: Agree
Standardized/templated design/planning
products and tactics, techniques and
procedures (TTPs) for various core tasks reduces delivery time, improves quality, and
boosts safety
effectiveness
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 5
 Overall group sense: Agree
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Question and Statistical Information
Provide ability to stand up and stand down a
capability quickly - reduces requirement for
local unit to have to vet a need through RFF
process
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 5
 Overall group sense: Agree

Response Distribution

Hub-managed material yards - provides
potentially more expedient
construction/repair material requirements and
movement procurement option, reducing the
need for local installations to work these
issues
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 5
 Overall group sense: Agree

Reduce wing (or Joint equivalent) level
frivolous contention over infrastructure
requirements and ownership of engineer
capability
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 3.5
 Overall group sense: Inconclusive

Optimized organizational proximity to
CFACC air mobility division (AMD) - helps
prioritize transportation
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 4
 Overall group sense: Agree
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Table 11. Follow-up Questionnaire, Question 2c Response Data

Associated operational advantage: Enhanced combat readiness of assigned personnel, defined as
personnel being appropriately trained and equipped to prosecute assigned duties/tasks effectively
Question and Statistical Information
Response Distribution
Train with those with whom personnel will
'fight'
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 3.5
 Overall group sense: Inconclusive

Standardized pre-deployment training and
equipping - a unified streamlined feedback
voice, particularly in Joint training
environments, helps focus training and
equipping efforts on most relevant needs
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 4
 Overall group sense: Agree

Elements of self-sustainment - hub-andspoke units do not have to rely solely on
resources procured locally or from supported
unit for work, movement, or force
sustainment requirements
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 4
 Overall group sense: Agree

Some units had physician and religious
support team (RST) support - provided
timely personnel support as needed and
ensured focus on mission
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 3
 Overall group sense: Neutral
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Table 12. Follow-up Questionnaire, Question 3 Response Data
Questionnaire directions: Responses to Questionnaire #1, Questions 2 and 3 regarding
applicability of the hub-and-spoke organizational concept in another AOR suggested the
following themes. Please review and rate your agreement with the following statement about
operational advantages and subsequent caveats, conditions, and/or constraints that respondents
suggested may influence CE hub-and-spoke force planning and employment decisions.
Question and Statistical Information
Response Distribution
All operational advantages previously
suggested are potentially relevant to hub-andspoke-organized CE units supporting the
CFACC in another AOR
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 5
 Overall group sense: Agree

There is limited evidence for a proof of
concept for using hub-and-spoke-organized
CE units in Phase 1/2 combat operations
where active beddowns are on-going and
infrastructure and materials procurement
lines are not robust
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 1.5
 Overall group sense: Disagree

The challenge of inter/intra-theater
movement (air, ground, or sea-borne) must
be addressed by planners determining
required manning levels and associated
equipment and materials requirements
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 4.5
 Overall group sense: Agree
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Question and Statistical Information
It is critical that consideration be given to
siting resources so that extreme distances or
"islanding" of resources that could provide a
means of self-sustainment, if co-located, is
avoided
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 4.5
 Overall group sense: Agree

Response Distribution

Consideration must be made for how the
possibility of future coalition situations may
affect H/S manpower, disposition, and
training requirements - support equipment
could introduce redundancies or falling in on
foreign infrastructure may impose serious
operational constraints
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 3.5
 Overall group sense: Generally agree
Must have a pool of 'good' troop labor
projects, especially when they are standing
by to execute more appropriate
emergency/surge tasks
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 5
 Overall group sense: Agree

Planners must be aware that the advantage of
being able to flex personnel from one
squadron to another can be tempered when
some squadrons are TACON to another HHQ
within the JTF
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 4.5
 Overall group sense: Agree
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Question and Statistical Information
Allowance must be given for loss in
procurement effectiveness if policy dictates
all procurement be accomplished centrally consideration must be given to
materials/equipment that can be more
effectively/efficiently procured locally
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 4
 Overall group sense: Agree

Response Distribution

Planners should fully consider for boots-onground (BOG) constraints as these may
mitigate some of the potential operational
advantages that hub-and-spoke organized
units may offer
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 4
 Overall group sense: Agree

Air Force corporate culture challenge of local
WG/CCs' expectation of owning their own
robust CE capability (ie, "one base, one
boss") must be addressed
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 5
 Overall group sense: Agree

The impact of no organic physician and/or
RST support within a hub-and-spokeorganized CE group must be more fully
considered
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 3
 Overall group sense: Inconclusive
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Table 13. Follow-up Questionnaire, Question 4 Response Data
Questionnaire directions: The following are additional responses categorized as potential
considerations for planning future expeditionary CE hub-and-spoke organized units. Please
review and rate your agreement with these statements.
Question and Statistical Information
Hub-and-spoke-organized CE units should be
considered for support to contingency
exercises and exercise-related construction
requirements
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 5
 Overall group sense: Agree

Response Distribution

When hub-and-spoke unit is leveraging both
Prime BEEF and RED HORSE capabilities,
it would be best to ensure the group
commander (usually an O-6) has had
operational RH experience prior to assuming
command of the group
 Number of respondents: 6
 Median: 1.5
 Overall group sense: Bimodal/Disagree

Chapter Summary
This chapter presented the results of the application of the Delphi technique to the
problem of determining success factors that influence successful delivery of operational
advantages offered by hub-and-spoke organized expeditionary CE units. The statistical
analysis provided a means to measure the degree to which the SME panel agreed or
disagreed with each theme suggested by responses to the initial questionnaire. SME panel
member responses suggested three operational advantages and associated critical success
factors, some of which may require further research to develop operational tools to boost
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the probability that they may be replicated in the future. However, based on review of the
discussed measures of central tendency and visual inspection of the response histogram,
consensus could not be claimed or the panel suggested general disagreement on ten
themes. These themes and implications of the group's sentiment about them are discussed
further in Chapter V.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Air Force expeditionary civil engineer (CE) support to contingency operations in
southwest Asia (SWA) created a unique organizational learning environment related to
how CE forces can better organize to support geographically separated units in a
manpower-constrained environment and more effectively command and control those
organizations and their capabilities in support of future contingency operations. This
research acquired insights and recommendations into a formative theory on hub-andspoke force planning of expeditionary engineers. It did so by utilizing grounded theory
methods to determine factors required for SWA CE hub-and-spoke units' success and
caveats, conditions, or constraints force planners may take into account when considering
the concept's application to future contingencies. CE manpower planners will benefit
from future research attempting to operationalize the success factors determined by this
research by further exploring their roots and developing new planning tools to support
decision-makers. To aid this effort, reviewed in this chapter are the themes upon which
the panel agreed most strongly, caveats to the research in the form of a limitations
discussion and special interest theme presentation, and potential future research topics.

High Consensus Themes
Twenty themes emerged upon which the group displayed a high degree of
consensus and agreement as demonstrated by the associated median value of the Likert
responses and visual inspection of the histograms. These factors represent the essence of
what made it possible for expeditionary CE hub-and-spoke units in SWA to enhance
general engineering functional command and control, increase CE capability
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responsiveness to supported commanders, and ensure the continued combat readiness of
assigned manpower. In their absence, mission capability would likely have been severely
degraded. Manpower planners may be well-served if they account for these factors when
considering future hub-and-spoke CONOPs and associated manpower planning tools.
Table 14 provides a tabular summary of these themes in rank order of the degree to which
the expert panel appeared to agree with each theme and relative response dispersion
demonstrated by the response histogram. Accounts from literature, informal pilot
discussions with non-participant stakeholders, and qualitative comments included on each
questionnaire compelled inclusion of some themes in this list that did not necessarily
achieve the highest possible Likert rating median score among participants. An expanded
discussion follows the table.
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Table 14. High Consensus Success Factor Summary
Median
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
4.5
4.5
4.5
4.5
4
4
4

Success Factor
Empowerment to freely re-appropriate (or cross-level) CE resources within the
group to ensure appropriate concentration of mass at the most opportune locations
Ability to cross-level and tailor manpower, equipment, and material mixes to each
specific requirement/task
Smooth interoperability with other higher echelons of agile combat support (ACS)
functionals (ie, Contracting, Comm, Logistics, Finance, etc)
Adhere to centralized control-decentralized execution concept by
establishing/preserving vital tactical-level relationships while ensuring tactical
capability is surged most effectively to support theater operational objectives
Hub-managed material yards
Maintain lean manpower and process overhead by centralizing core engineering
functions
Centralize project tasking and command authority
Theater-wide visibility of requirements and ability to press the supported
commander for his/her priorities
Provide ability to stand up and stand down a capability quickly
Effectively address scope creep - when a spoke'd team comes in to address an
infrastructure requirement, it is apparent they are not a permanent presence that can
be tasked with additional work without appropriate vetting
Standardized/templated design/planning products and tactics, techniques and
procedures (TTPs) for various core tasks
Retain ability to communicate about and maintain accountability for RFF'd
capabilities
Having contracting, finance, and supply personnel organic to the unit - provides
another option for procurement of Class IV and others, potentially shortening lead
times when local contracting and CAP contracts are overwhelmed or are otherwise
experiencing diminished effectiveness
Clearly communicated and utilized TACON, OPCON, and ADCON relationships
Ensure support/supported force relationships are clearly delineated (especially to
Joint partners)
Efficient materials handling and personnel movement logistics
Effective project prioritization through an 'asset management' approach to theater
infrastructure requirements
Increased flexibility in personnel waivers due to deeper 'bench' when hub-and-spoke
unit is group-sized
Optimized organizational proximity to CFACC air mobility division (AMD)
Elements of self-sustainment - hub-and-spoke units do not have to rely solely on
resources procured locally or from supported unit for work, movement, or force
sustainment requirements

The supported commanders' enablement of CE hub-and-spoke units to freely reappropriate, also referred to as cross-level, CE resources within the hub-and-spoke unit
appeared to ensure appropriate concentration of engineering capability at the most
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opportune locations. Furthermore, the panel felt that the ability to cross-level and tailor
not just manpower, but also equipment and material, mixes to each specific task was also
critical to the successful delivery of operational advantages to the supported commanders.
When Prime BEEF teams comprise ECESs aligned in direct support of a single
installation commander, this cross-leveling is often not possible. When operations are in
protracted durations of transition between kinetic and sustainment phases, manpower
requirements at the ECES level can vary widely. The hub-and-spoke organizational
construct appears to offer a viable solution by being able to temporarily surge personnel
and then quickly stand them down when the requirement no longer exists.
Responsiveness is enhanced as a result of eliminating the requirement to go through the
RFF vetting process every time a new manning requirement emerges. Furthermore, close
organizational proximity to the CFACC and COCOM staff responsible for vetting RFFs
made it possible to more effectively advocate for increases and decreases in personnel
attached to the unit via RFF. Panel member qualitative responses suggested that this
method of RFF accountability made possible by the CE hub-and-spoke directly addressed
a perceived breakdown in the Joint RFF process. Thus, the perception was that personnel
numbers were able to be more sustainably and effectively managed by the CE hub-andspoke organization compared to the legacy Prime BEEF organizational alignment.
Theater-wide visibility of requirements was facilitated by close organizational
proximity to the supported commander. Project tasking and command authority was
centralized. This ensured the right capability was being applied in the right way at the
right time, or as close to it as possible, to support theater-level objectives. However, CE
units centered at secondary hubs were free to establish and maintain vital tactical-level
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relationships with supported units, thereby maintaining appropriate situational awareness
of ongoing and anticipated requirements.
Particularly in Joint operating environments, clearly communicated and utilized
TACON, operational control (OPCON), and ADCON relationships are critical to the
effective employment of CE capability. The advocacy phase preceding CE hub-andspoke unit operations in SWA catalyzed necessary discussions regarding TACON,
OPCON, and ADCON in Joint environments. Aligning and solidifying these
relationships was a key factor in ensuring CE hub-and-spoke unit effectiveness and will
likely ensure success of hub-and-spoke-organized CE units operating in support of future
contingencies. Ensuring effective understanding of these relationships both within the
hub-and-spoke organization and among the supported commanders - particularly in the
Joint operational environment - made it possible to more effectively leverage CE
capabilities.
Elements of core engineering functions like planning, programming, and design
were centralized as much as practical to maintain a lean manpower and process overhead.
This minimized redundancy and facilitated the use of more craftspersons on the front
lines of repair and construction efforts. Reductions in base master plan and design
delivery times, improvements in quality, and increases in occupational safety records
boosts were realized as these products were standardized and templated. Standardized
tactics, techniques, and procedures were more readily implemented across CE hub-andspoke units and readily updated as scenarios unfolded. This agile responsiveness
translated directly to improved organizational effectiveness.
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CE hub-and-spoke units streamlined the behind-the-lines tasks associated with
facilitating work in the field. Organizational and physical proximity at the hubs to other
ACS functions like contracting, communications, logistics, and finance helped facilitate
smooth interoperability with these functional communities. Being a theater-level asset
rather than a local ECES appeared to provide a necessary boost in priority to keep
resources flowing. The hub-managed materials yards that were subsequently populated
also acted, in concept, as an effective method of ensuring consistent-as-possible flow of
materials. This translated directly to efficient materials handling. Personnel movement
logistics were also facilitated as well as could be expected by the hub-and-spoke units'
organizational proximity to the theater air mobility division.
Once teams were dispatched to address identified and vetted infrastructure
requirements, the hub-and-spoke organization was able to effectively address local scope
creep. This appeared tenable for two primary reasons. Senior officers stationed at the
teams' hub(s) enabled appropriate organizational top cover to reprioritize requirements
offered locally by installation leaders at the locations to which the teams forward
deployed. Additionally, when a spoke team would arrive to address an infrastructure
requirement, it was apparent they were not a permanent presence that could be tasked
with additional work without appropriate vetting. This kept the teams appropriately
focused on the mission essential tasks of most interest to the supported theater
commander. Furthermore, elements of self-sustainment meant forward deployed teams
did not have to rely solely on resources procured locally or from supported unit for work,
movement, or force sustainment requirements.
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In addition to the success factors, the panel appeared to achieve consensus on six
caveat, condition, or constraint themes. Table 15 summarizes these themes. Responses
suggested general disagreement with the caveat that limited evidence exists for using
hub-and-spoke CE units in the phases of large scale operations that are most kinetic.
Most of those who disagreed offered qualitative comments to characterize their
sentiment. They noted that, particularly in the heavy construction and repair aspects of
the CE mission, hub-and-spoke operations provided the closest-to-ideal solution for
flexibly massing general engineering effects at the most opportune times. They pointed to
personal experiences in both Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI
FREEDOM (OIF) as further evidence of success. Additional qualitative comments
pertained to a perceived need to address the corporate Air Force's "one base, one boss"
culture.
Table 15. High Consensus Caveat/Condition/Constraint Themes
Median
5
5
4.5
4.5
4.5
1.5

Caveat/Condition/Constraint Theme
Air Force corporate culture challenge of local WG/CCs' expectation of
owning their own robust CE capability (ie, "one base, one boss") must be
addressed
Must have a pool of 'good' troop labor projects, especially when they are
standing by to execute more appropriate emergency/surge tasks
The challenge of inter/intra-theater movement (air, ground, or sea-borne)
must be addressed by planners determining required manning levels and
associated equipment and materials requirements
Planners must be aware that the advantage of being able to flex personnel
from one squadron to another can be tempered when some squadrons are
TACON to another HHQ within the JTF
It is critical that consideration be given to siting resources so that extreme
distances or "islanding" of resources that could provide a means of selfsustainment, if co-located, is avoided
There is limited evidence for a proof of concept for using hub-and-spokeorganized CE units in Phase 1/2 combat operations where active beddowns
are on-going and infrastructure and materials procurement lines are not robust
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Special Interest Themes
Certain themes may be of special interest if additional questionnaires are
contemplated as a part of a follow-up research effort. This interest may be due to their
low consensus level, inconclusive response data, or outright rejection by the SME panel
members. The SME panel did not appear to reach consensus on 11 items, as
demonstrated by visual inspection of the histograms of Likert scale responses. Panel
member responses to some themes also suggested only moderate levels of agreement or
disagreement, suggesting lukewarm acceptance, response bias, or unclear questionnaire
language. Finally, the panel disagreed with several of the themes suggested by one or
more qualitative responses to the initial questionnaire. While subsequent questionnaires
could catalyze consensus one way or the other, they could also serve as confirmation that
multiple diverging opinions are currently held by CE SMEs.
The median and histogram of panel member responses suggested only moderate
agreement with the operational advantage pertaining to the hub-and-spoke organization's
potential to boost in-theater combat readiness of assigned personnel. An additional phase
of inquiry may have clarified why this was the case or provided a means for the research
team to clarify its impressions. Qualitative responses of the disagree and neutral
responses suggested panel member confusion with how the advantage was
communicated. They also suggested that qualifiers may have been needed to more
appropriately narrow its focus. They noted that personnel readiness is primarily the
responsibility of the MAJCOM to which personnel are permanently assigned. Perhaps
stronger consensus for this item could have been attained if additional background
verbiage had been included in the questionnaire.

75

A suggested success factor supporting the enhanced command and control
operational advantage that received lukewarm support stated that RFF personnel were not
attached to the original requesting unit regardless of whether the need remained for them,
thus reducing the need to augment a local traditionally-aligned CE squadron directly with
RFF or temporary duty (TDY) forces. Qualitative responses to this item suggested that its
wording may have been unclear to the panelists. Based on qualitative comments provided
by panelists, it appeared that neutral responses may have shifted towards agree if the
wording had been clarified in a subsequent follow-up questionnaire. Based on these
responses, a subsequent questionnaire may have catalyzed consensus in the agree range
or confirmed the existence of two groups of thought within the panel.
Another suggested success factor supporting the enhanced command and control
operational advantage that received subdued support stated that having ADCON aligned
exclusively through Air Force channels ensures Airman are taken care of in a way that
will best facilitate future professional military development. Qualitative responses to this
item suggested that its wording may have been unclear to the panelists. Based on
qualitative comments provided by panelists, it appeared that neutral responses may have
shifted towards agree if the wording had been clarified in a subsequent follow-up
questionnaire. Based on these responses, a subsequent questionnaire may have catalyzed
consensus in the agree range or confirmed the existence of two groups of thought within
the panel.
A suggested success factor supporting the presence of the improved
responsiveness to supported commander advantage that did not achieve consensus stated
that this advantage was achieved by reducing wing (or Joint equivalent) level perhaps76

frivolous tactical level contentions over infrastructure requirements and ownership of
engineer capability. Panel members did not offer qualifying comments to aid in the
interpretation of their responses. The response histogram was mound-shaped offset to the
right of neutral, suggesting a potential slightly agree sentiment. However, half the
respondents characterized their level of agreement as neutral or disagree. This suggests
that the disagreements themselves were not resolved at all, that perhaps the presence of
the CE hub-and-spoke was not the cause of a reduction of this functional dissonance, or
that the statement itself was altogether unclear.
Another suggested factor that did not achieve consensus supported the premise
that CE hub-and-spoke organizations in SWA improved combat readiness of assigned
members. It stated that this advantage was delivered as a result of personnel training with
those with whom they would serve in-theater immediately prior to the deployment. Panel
members offered few qualitative comments to describe their ratings. However, one
described the disagree rating by stating that the advantage could only be applicable to a
future hub-and-spoke unit if the state-side squadron deployed its squadron en masse.
Panelists responding to a follow-up questionnaire with additional clarifying information
may have achieved consensus on this item.
A suggested factor that achieved only slightly agree consensus supported the
premise that CE hub-and-spoke organizations in SWA improved combat readiness of
assigned members. It stated that this advantage was delivered at least partially as a result
of having physician and religious support team (RST) support directly attached to some
hub-and-spoke units. While none of the panelists offered a disagree response, qualitative
feedback suggested even less support for this factor than the numerical responses
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indicated. While panelists appeared to support the premise that these support elements
were certainly useful to those SWA hub-and-spoke CE units that had them, their presence
was not an integral part of the ongoing or future success of the CE hub-and-spoke units.
A follow-up questionnaire with additional background information requesting revised
responses may have strengthened the consensus on this item.
The panel generally agreed with the condition that consideration should be made
for how the possibility of situations where there is closer collaboration with coalition
nation partners for infrastructure needs may affect hub-and-spoke manpower levels,
disposition, and training requirements. However, a theme emerged from the qualitative
response that tempered this sentiment. Specifically, it suggested that this situation may be
present in most future operational contexts and must thus be taken regardless of how CE
capability is presented.
Responses suggested that the group maintained no consensus in its sentiment
about the caveat that the impact of having no organic physician or RST support in the
latest iteration of the CE hub-and-spoke in SWA must be more fully investigated. Only
those who disagreed offered qualitative comments to characterize their sentiment. They
noted that they had specifically not seen this as a limiting factor in their personal
experience within both the current ECEG and the EPBG before it. Perhaps another
follow-up questionnaire may have catalyzed a shift in opinion one way or the other
among those who were neutral on the subject.
The group appeared to reject the suggested innovation related to ensuring that
future CE hub-and-spoke group commanders have operational RED HORSE experience
in their duty history. Most of those who disagreed offered additional strongly-worded
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qualitative justification. While one third of the group appeared to agree with the
assertion, they provided no additional justification in support. This does not necessarily
invalidate their input but having the chance to review their initial responses via another
follow-up questionnaire may have provided a catalyst to justify or modify their
responses.

Implications and Recommendations for Future Research
Summarized in Chapter II, the historical analysis phase of this research effort
suffered from gaps in recent data and knowledge that perhaps should have been readily
available through Air Force or Joint OIL databases. AARs, end of tour reports, and exit
interviews canvassing the time periods of interest to this research were generally not
available from previously established sources. Most of those obtained for use by this
research were via personal contact with either the CE observations, innovations, and
lessons learned (OIL) primary point of contact or the individuals responsible for their
generation. Furthermore, even if the applicable theoretical basis for developing tools to
apply the success factors documented by this research existed, the quantitative data
required for such analysis are not readily available and conflicting expectations exist
within the CE operational community about the existence of these data. The Air Force
CE corporate knowledge management enterprise may benefit from research exploring
how to more effectively codify applicable expeditionary knowledge and collect the data
required to develop tools that help operationalize it. Perhaps simply tracking down
manpower productivity and AAR data and populating OIL databases already present
may be the best alternative.
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The Air Force Civil Engineer Center's (AFCEC) Readiness Division (CEX) is
well-positioned within the CE community to continue its record of facilitation of
expeditionary knowledge transfer by partnering with the Center's renewed research focus.
The professionals within the CEX expeditionary engineering section act as the SMEs for
the Prime BEEF and RED HORSE issues within the Air Force and Joint environments.
They also manage various inputs into war planning documents and act as a focal point for
deliberate planning, which can benefit from further operational research and subsequent
development of more quantitative planning tools. Their active input to research agents
capable of operationalizing the advantages and success factors documented by this
research is critical. Partnering with military research entities like the Air Force Institute
of Technology to perform this research can also have the added benefit of facilitating the
professional military education of company grade officers. While applying the necessary
analytical rigor to these force planning problems, they also develop CE force planning
knowledge they can then use to make informed decisions based on perspectives honed by
exposure to operational doctrine within the context of addressing real world challenges.
They can be thus better-equipped to act as effective advocates for Air Force CE's support
to the Air Force and Joint operational communities.
In the scoping phase of this research, a CE senior leader reiterated one of the
ultimate force planning goals he maintains for his planning staff. His intent is to
operationalize the success factors distilled by this project so future hub-and-spoke
organized CE capabilities can offer the supported commander with operational
advantages analogous to those offered to the SWA combined forces air component
commander (CFACC). Two primary areas may be worth considering as future research
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goals to help operationalize the success factors documented by this research: the
development of hub-and-spoke manpower optimization tools and geospatial beddown
siting tools. Their success relies on several factors outlined in the next two sections.
Development of a Manpower Optimization Tool
Arguably the research outcome most readily useful to CE force planners may be
the production of a hub-and-spoke unit manpower sizing tool. A goal programming
optimization tool may be such a solution since presenting expeditionary CE surge
capabilities in a hub-and-spoke fashion inherently introduces the possibility of tradeoffs.
Engineer force planning is a problem of using finite manpower, supplies, and equipment
to accomplish a seemingly-endless stream of engineer requirements. A wing commander
may wish to upgrade base facilities to enhance the installation residents’ quality of life or
posture it for mission expansion later in the campaign but is unable to do so with the
sustainment CE manpower level the installation is authorized. More generally, in the
absence of a compulsory draft, it remains necessary to preserve the operations tempo
(OPSTEMPO) of non-deployed personnel at a sustainable rate. If the maximum number
of personnel were available for the duration of a campaign, the risk of longer term
degradation of the CE functional community would become unacceptably high. For
these reasons, the problem of creating a hub-and-spoke unit manpower recommendation
for the supported combatant commander (COCOM) lends itself to having optimization
analysis applied.
The possibility of multiple goals for the use of the wide spectrum of CE capability
can be high. For this reason, it is possible that a new multi-criteria decision making
(MCDM) tool could be of use to CE force planners. Given the sustainable mission
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accomplishment objectives stated by senior leadership, the most relevant steps upon
which to focus in the development of a MCDM tool may be the definition of model
attributes and determining their objective weights. Proposing values for these may require
a combination of further qualitative analysis of end-of-tour reports, elicitation of expert
opinion, and quantitative analysis of productivity levels demonstrated by SWA CE huband-spoke units. Expert opinion may be required to determine the most appropriate
constraints and objectives and their relative hierarchy. Man-hour productivity data may
also provide the basis for the weighting or revision of historical, published productivity
expectations.
As this research found, little in the way of CE hub-and-spoke unit manpower
productivity data are readily available for analysis. Addressing this challenge may be the
first step in the development of a MCDM manning tool. Additionally, consideration may
need to be given to developing hybrid surrogate measures of CE manpower need and
exploring the interaction between both the UTC and enduring location approaches.
Research by Winkler (2011) and others began this exploration by evaluating recent
evolutions of bases from austere expeditionary to enduring locations and associated
impacts on CE manpower requirements. CE hub-and-spoke manpower planning
effectiveness may be aided by similar analysis of hub-and-spoke manpower requirements
as tactical infrastructure evolves. Once these data have been captured, more advanced
statistical techniques than the simple descriptive ones used in this research could be
applied to determine if official CE instructions should be revised to reflect the labor
productivity demonstrated by CE hub-and-spoke units in SWA.
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Another potential approach to developing an optimization model may be offered
by the transportation and logistics operations research disciplines. Methods of gaining
and maintaining operational and competitive advantages are continuously sought through
the study of the hub-and-spoke network concept applied to logistics problems. Of
particular interest to CE hub-and-spoke organizational planners may be logistics
researchers' interest in the degree to which selective centralization of given functions
offers systems-level operational advantages. Research into striking the optimal
centralization-decentralization balance and finding methods of continuously evaluating
that balance's ability to make an expeditionary CE organization effective may offer
valuable insight to Air Force leaders and force planners. Additionally, treating CE
capability as "packages" to be delivered and leveraged at a destination may yield useful
perspectives.
Geospatial Tools
Developing geospatial tools may assist CE force planners' decision-making with
regard to the physical disposition of CE hub-and-spoke capabilities. These tools may help
answer a question like, "What is the optimal hub location for a hub-and-spoke-organized
CE unit fulfilling expeditionary Air Force infrastructure requirements in a given
contingency?" To answer this question, the researcher may consider potential variables
for inclusion in a given CE hub-and-spoke physical disposition recommendation tool,
assessing both significance of the variables to force disposition decision-making and
practical aspects of data availability in the time available for the project. Perhaps
available literature and discussions with SMEs in the CE functional community would
confirm that analysis of primary variables would facilitate development of a geospatially83

derived recommendation for CE unit disposition. The researcher could enhance the
validity of this type of project by eliciting SME opinion on objective weights or variable
hierarchies for the variables. A preliminary list could include:








Size/Length of Runway(s) at candidate airfields
Type of aircraft expected to be utilized for routine mission-related
transportation
Range of those expected aircraft
Relative location of candidate airfields to each other
Relative location of candidate airfields to seaports
Land area under coalition control in given phases of a major
campaign/conflict
Average annual precipitation at candidate beddown sites

Conclusion
This research offered insight into a formative theory on hub-and-spoke force
planning for expeditionary engineers by documenting concepts and operational
experiences previously held as tacit knowledge by SMEs. It documented factors that
influenced the successful delivery of operational advantages offered by hub-and-spoke
organized expeditionary CE units in SWA and made an initial determination about their
applicability to CE hub-and-spoke units supporting future contingencies. It did so by first
conducting an historical analysis of published CE history, manpower planning guidance,
AARs, and the methods available to elicit SME knowledge in an effort to address
published knowledge gaps. It then utilized a modified Delphi technique to elicit SME
opinion about the operational advantages CE hub-and-spoke units offered to supported
commanders in SWA and the factors that led to their successful delivery. It concluded by
offering perspective on the findings' implications and recommendations for future
research.
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Appendix A. Delphi Study Phase One
CE Hub-and-spoke Delphi Study Questionnaire #1
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this Delphi Study. The purpose of this study is to perform
research relating to AF civil engineer capability presentation in the PACAF AOR. The objective is to
determine how operational advantages like those realized in southwest Asia when expeditionary CE
capability was organized in a hub-and-spoke fashion may be replicated in PACAF. The sponsor for this
research is Colonel Karl Bosworth, PACAF/A7, Joint Base Hickam-Pearl, HI.
Please note the following:
Benefits and risks: There are no personal benefits or risks for participating in this study. Your participation
in completing this questionnaire should take 30-45 minutes per round.
Confidentiality: Your responses are completely confidential, and your identity will remain anonymous.
No individual data will be reported; only data in aggregate will be made public. Data will be kept in a
secure, locked cabinet to which only the researchers will have access. If you have any questions or
concerns about your participation in this study, please contact:
JOSHUA A. HAGER, Captain, USAF
GEM Student
Graduate School of Engineering and Management
Air Force Institute of Technology
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
DSN 312-785-3636
Comm 937-255-3636

TAY W. JOHANNES, P.E., PhD, Lt Col, USAF
Assistant Professor of Engineering Management
Graduate School of Engineering and Management
Air Force Institute of Technology
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
DSN 312-785-3636
Comm 937-255-3636

Voluntary consent: Your participation is completely voluntary. You have the right to decline to answer
any question, to refuse to participate, or to withdraw at any time. Your decision of whether or not to
participate will not result in any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. Completion
of the questionnaire implies your consent to participate.
Background:
Contingency Air Force civil engineer (CE) capabilities have come to be presented to combatant
commanders primarily in the form of Prime BEEF and RED HORSE teams. While these units have
traditionally been controlled by various levels of an often-sprawling command structure, local wing
commanders have developed a reasonable expectation that at least one Prime BEEF team will be assigned
to a particular installation and controlled by that wing commander for the purpose of operating and
maintaining local base infrastructure. And that RED HORSE resources will be commanded and controlled
by the command echelon above wing. Most recently, the Expeditionary Prime BEEF Group (EPBG),
Expeditionary RED HORSE Group (ERHG), and Expeditionary Civil Engineer Group (ECEG) have been
utilized in the AFCENT AOR. These units use(d) a hub-and-spoke concept of operation to support
infrastructure project programming, design, troop construction, and contract construction management
requirements generated by SWA contingency operations. They have been aligned at the command echelon
above wing (or Joint equivalent), typically as part of a Joint task force. Anecdotal data and those found in
available end of tour reports suggest that this alignment, featuring traditional Prime BEEF capabilities and
the heavy repair/construction capabilities of RED HORSE under one command element, has made it
possible to better manage the utilization of expeditionary CE capability in the AFCENT AOR by enabling
functional commanders to allocate often-limited CE resources to the areas where these resources will have
the greatest impact on the mission.
This research effort is sponsored by the office of the PACAF/A7, who is seeking to ultimately
develop a CE force planning model that captures operational advantages SWA hub-and-spoke-organized
CE units have given to supported operations. Developing this model requires the distilling and codifying
force planning knowledge developed in the course of applying the hub-and-spoke organizational model to
CE units operating in OIF, OEF, and OND and applying appropriate facets of that knowledge to future
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operations plans in other AORs. Currently, only an ad hoc hub-and-spoke manpower model exists; it is
limited in its ability to reflect human resources requirements for constructing, repairing, and maintaining
expeditionary airfields. NOTE: This study is undertaken with the assumption that expeditionary CE
capability will be used primarily in direct support of the combined force air component commander
(CFACC), with support to Joint infrastructure requirements provided by exception.
By responding, you have the opportunity to shape how the AF CE functional community takes
advantage of lessons learned as a result of hub-and-spoke organizational innovations.. Thank you for
participating in this study and helping apply those lessons and the perspective you have honed through
years of CE service will to the next contingency. I appreciate your time and candid responses.
Process:
1. Please complete this questionnaire electronically and return it to: joshua.hager@afit.edu no later than
12 December 2012. If you have questions, I can be reached at that e-mail or at DSN:.317-785-3636
2. This questionnaire is an instrument of a Delphi study. The Delphi method is an iterative, group
communication process which is used to collect and distill the judgments of experts using a series of
questionnaires interspersed with feedback. The questionnaires are designed to focus on problems,
opportunities, solutions, or forecasts. Each questionnaire is developed based on the results of the previous
questionnaire. The process continues until the research question is answered. For example, when
consensus is reached, sufficient information has been exchanged. This usually takes, on average, 3-4
rounds.
3. There are three primary questions for this round. The survey is non-attribution, so please elaborate
fully on your answers and feel free to provide additional insight, if you deem it relevant, even if it is not
specifically requested by the questions. Once all interview responses are received and analyzed, you will
be asked to review and revise your initial responses based on responses provided by the entire group.
Subsequent rounds will be announced as needed and all research is scheduled to conclude by 6 February
2012.
Research questions:
Please answer the following questions as clearly and concisely as possible without omitting critical
information or rationale required for the group to consider your opinions. Base your responses on
your own personal experiences and perceptions.
1. What operational advantages do you perceive hub-and-spoke-organized expeditionary CE units offered
for meeting theater-level objectives effectively in SWA?
2. For the advantages you would identify as potentially relevant/applicable to supporting the CFACC in
another AOR, why would they be relevant?
3. For the advantages you would identify as NOT as potentially relevant/applicable to supporting the
CFACC in another AOR, why would they not be relevant?
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Appendix B. Delphi Study Phase Two
CE Hub-and-spoke Delphi Study Follow-up
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this Delphi Study. The purpose of this study is to perform
research relating to AF civil engineer capability presentation in the PACAF AOR. The objective is to
determine how operational advantages like those realized in southwest Asia when expeditionary CE
capability was organized in a hub-and-spoke fashion may be replicated in future contingencies. The
sponsor for this research is Colonel Karl Bosworth, PACAF/A7, Joint Base Hickam-Pearl, HI.
Please note the following:
Benefits and risks: There are no personal benefits or risks for participating in this study. Your participation
in completing this questionnaire should take 15-20 minutes.
Confidentiality: Your responses are completely confidential, and your identity will remain anonymous.
No individual data will be reported; only data in aggregate will be made public. Data will be kept in a
secure, locked cabinet to which only the researchers will have access. If you have any questions or
concerns about your participation in this study, please contact:
JOSHUA A. HAGER, Captain, USAF
GEM Student
Graduate School of Engineering and Management
Air Force Institute of Technology
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
DSN 312-785-3636
Comm 937-255-3636

TAY W. JOHANNES, P.E., PhD, Lt Col, USAF
Assistant Professor of Engineering Management
Graduate School of Engineering and Management
Air Force Institute of Technology
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
DSN 312-785-3636
Comm 937-255-3636

Voluntary consent: Your participation is completely voluntary. You have the right to decline to answer
any question, to refuse to participate, or to withdraw at any time. Your decision of whether or not to
participate will not result in any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. Completion
of the questionnaire implies your consent to participate.
Background:
Your responses to the first round questionnaire spoke directly to the operational advantages that
hub-and-spoke-organized CE units can offer to supported commanders. The question prompts were:
1) What operational advantages do you perceive hub-and-spoke-organized expeditionary CE units
offered for meeting theater-level objectives effectively in SWA?
2) For the advantages you would identify as potentially relevant/applicable to supporting the
CFACC in another AOR, why would they be relevant?
3) For the advantages you would identify as NOT as potentially relevant/applicable to supporting
the CFACC in another AOR, why would they not be relevant?
The content of the responses was subsequently analyzed and major themes summarized. The
response data suggest that hub-and-spoke-organized CE units can offer three primary operational
advantages to supported commanders compared to legacy organizational alignment(s). These advantages
appear to be most closely related to providing the supported combatant commander an improved ability to
leverage general and geospatial engineering capability within the context of the core doctrinal tenets of
unity of command, flexibility, versatility, and mass effects outlined in AFDD 3-34 Engineer Operations.
These suggested advantages include enhancements in:
1) Command and control effectiveness , defined as effectively ensuring the right personnel are
doing the right mission tasks fulfilling the requirements that most-impact the supported
operational mission
2) Responsiveness to supported commander, defined as providing a means of having appropriate
flexibility to shift mass effects of CE capability as required to meet mission requirements
and ensuring those effects are massed on the requirements that will have the greatest
effect on the mission.
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3) Combat readiness of assigned personnel, defined as personnel being appropriately trained and
equipped to prosecute assigned duties/tasks effectively
SME responses also suggest key factors, the absence of which would likely have had a particularly
negative effect on the delivery of the suggested operational advantages. In addition, responses suggest a
number of caveats, conditions, and/or constraints that senior leaders and planning staffs should consider
when making future CE hub-and-spoke force planning and organizational recommendations. Finally,
additional considerations were suggested for subsequent planning efforts. The following pages will guide
your review of these suggested themes by presenting them systematically and requesting your evaluation in
turn. I appreciate your time and candid responses.
Process:
1. The Delphi method is an iterative, group communication process used to elicit your expert opinion using
a series of questionnaires interspersed with feedback. Questionnaires are designed to focus on problems,
opportunities, solutions, or forecasts. Each follow-up questionnaire is developed based on the results of the
previous questionnaire. The process continues until the research question is answered. This takes, on
average, 3-4 rounds.
2. This follow-up questionnaire represents the second round of this study. Once all responses are received
and analyzed, you may be asked to review and revise your initial responses based on those provided by the
entire group. It is non-attribution, so please elaborate fully on any qualitative comments you feel are
necessary and feel free to provide additional insight, if you deem it relevant, even if it is not specifically
requested by the questions. Subsequent rounds will be announced as needed and all research is scheduled
to conclude by 6 February 2012.
3. Please complete this questionnaire electronically and return it to: joshua.hager@afit.edu no later than
21 January 2013. If you have questions, I can be reached at that e-mail or at DSN: 317-785-3636.
Directions:
Using the 5-point Likert Scale presented below, please rate your agreement with the themes suggested by
the group's answers to the original research questions summarized in Background. Feel free to provide
additional qualitative responses to any of the FOUR (4) questions, communicating as clearly and concisely
as possible without omitting critical information or rationale required for the group to consider your
opinions. Base your responses on your own personal experiences and perceptions.
Rating Scale:
5 - Strongly Agree
4 - Agree
3 - Neutral
2 - Disagree
1 - Strongly Disagree

1. Please review and rate your agreement with the following operational advantages that respondents
perceived hub-and-spoke-organized expeditionary CE units offered for meeting theater-level objectives
effectively in SWA.
Advantage
Rating
Comments
Enhanced command and control effectiveness
Improved responsiveness to supported commander
Enhanced combat readiness of assigned personnel
Additional comments (if necessary):
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2. For each operational advantage identified in Questionnaire #1, Question 1, panel member responses
suggested the potential for numerous factors required for delivery of the suggested operational advantages.
Please review and rate the degree to which you agree with the following factors for success suggested for
each operational advantage provided by hub-and-spoke-organized CE units specifically.
a) Enhanced command and control effectiveness , defined as effectively ensuring the right personnel are
doing the right mission tasks fulfilling the requirements that most-impact the supported operational mission
Factors for Success
Rating
Comments
Empowerment to freely re-appropriate (or cross-level)
CE resources within the group to ensure appropriate
concentration of mass at the most opportune locations
Ability to cross-level and tailor manpower, equipment,
and material mixes to each specific requirement/task
Clearly communicated and utilized TACON, OPCON,
and ADCON relationships
Adhere to centralized control/decentralized execution
concept by establishing/preserving vital tactical-level
relationships while ensuring tactical capability is
surged in the most effective way to support theaterlevel operational objectives
Ensure local installation personnel footprint remains
lean, facilitating effective boots-on-ground (BOG)
numbers management - local unit sheds requirement
to have a large or frequently expanding/contracting
permanent party manpower numbers to support
Request-for-forces (RFF) personnel are not attached to
the original requesting unit regardless of whether the
need remains for them - reduces the need to augment
local ECES organization directly with RFF or TDY
forces
Blue-on-Blue ADCON ensures Airman are taken care
of in a way that will best facilitate future career
development
Maintain lean manpower and process overhead by
centralizing core engineering functions (ie, planning,
programming, design) - eliminates redundancy and
facilitates more shovel-and-pick operations
Retain ability to communicate about and maintain
accountability for RFF'd capabilities - ensures ability
to rapidly vet emerging requirements that may require
a supported unit to submit a RFF by determining if
need can be met by simply standing up a spoke'd team
to address the requirement
Centralize project tasking and command authority
Ensure support/supported force relationships are
delineated (especially to Joint partners) - provides a
clear organizational context in which to work
Increased flexibility in personnel waivers due to
deeper 'bench' when hub-and-spoke unit is groupsized
Ability to communicate observations, innovations, and
lessons learned across in-theater functional
community through the use of various update tools one O-6 commander improves the chances that
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lessons learned and other 'news' is synthesized and
disseminated as appropriate
b) Improved responsiveness to supported commander, defined as providing a means of having appropriate
flexibility to shift mass effects of CE capability as required to meet mission requirements and ensuring
those effects are massed on the requirements that will have the greatest effect on the mission.
Factors for Success
Rating
Comments
Effective project prioritization through an 'asset management'
approach to theater infrastructure requirements
Efficient materials handling and personnel movement logistics
Theater-wide visibility of requirements and ability to press the
supported commander for his/her priorities - ensures the right
capability is being applied in the right way at the right time (or
as close to it as possible)
Effectively address scope creep - when a spoke'd team comes
in to address an infrastructure requirement, it is apparent they
are not a permanent presence that can be tasked with
additional work without appropriate vetting
Smooth interoperability with other higher echelons of agile
combat support (ACS) functionals (ie, Contracting, Comm,
Logistics, Finance, etc) - being a theater level asset, rather
than a local CE squadron, enhances this potential
Contracting, finance, and supply personnel organic to the unit
- provides another option for procurement of Class IV and
others, potentially shortening lead times when local
contracting and civil augmentation program (CAP) contracts
are overwhelmed or are otherwise experiencing diminished
effectiveness
Standardized/templated design/planning products and tactics,
techniques and procedures (TTPs) for various core tasks reduces delivery time, improves quality, and boosts safety
Provide ability to stand up and stand down a capability
quickly - reduces requirement for local unit to have to vet a
need through RFF process
Hub-managed material yards - provides potentially more
expedient construction/repair material requirements and
movement procurement option, reducing the need for local
installations to work these issues
Reduce wing (or Joint equivalent) level frivolous contention
over infrastructure requirements and ownership of engineer
capability
Optimized organizational proximity to CFACC air mobility
division (AMD) - helps prioritize transportation
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c) Enhanced combat readiness of assigned personnel, defined as personnel being appropriately trained and
equipped to prosecute assigned duties/tasks effectively
Factors for Success
Rating
Comments
Train with those with whom personnel will 'fight'
Standardized pre-deployment training and equipping
- a unified streamlined feedback voice, particularly in
Joint training environments, helps focus training and
equipping efforts on most relevant needs
Elements of self-sustainment - hub-and-spoke units
do not have to rely solely on resources procured
locally or from supported unit for work, movement,
or force sustainment requirements
Some units had physician and religious support team
(RST) support - provided timely personnel support as
needed and ensured focus on mission
Additional comments (if necessary):
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3. Responses to Questionnaire #1, Questions 2 and 3 regarding applicability of the hub-and-spoke
organizational concept in another AOR suggested the following themes. Please review and rate your
agreement with the following statement about operational advantages and subsequent caveats, conditions,
and/or constraints that respondents suggested may influence CE hub-and-spoke force planning and
employment decisions.
Category
Rating
Comments
All operational advantages previously
suggested are potentially relevant to hub-andspoke-organized CE units supporting the
CFACC in another AOR
Caveats/Conditions/Constraints
There is limited evidence for a proof of concept
for using hub-and-spoke-organized CE units in
Phase 1/2 combat operations where active
beddowns are on-going and infrastructure and
materials procurement lines are not robust
The challenge of inter/intra-theater movement
(air, ground, or sea-borne) must be addressed by
planners determining required manning levels and
associated equipment and materials requirements
It is critical that consideration be given to siting
resources so that extreme distances or "islanding"
of resources that could provide a means of selfsustainment, if co-located, is avoided
Consideration must be made for how the
possibility of future coalition collaboration
situations may affect hub-and-spoke manpower
levels, disposition, and training requirements prime power and other support equipment could
introduce redundancies; falling in on foreign
electrical infrastructure may impose serious
operational constraints
Must have a pool of 'good' troop labor projects,
especially when they are standing by to execute
more appropriate emergency/surge tasks
Planners must be aware that the advantage of
being able to flex personnel from one squadron to
another can be tempered when some squadrons
are TACON to another HHQ within the JTF
Allowance must be given for loss in procurement
effectiveness if policy dictates all procurement be
accomplished centrally -consideration must be
given to materials/equipment that can be more
effectively/efficiently procured locally
Planners should fully consider for boots-onground (BOG) constraints as these may mitigate
some of the potential operational advantages that
hub-and-spoke organized units may offer
Air Force corporate culture challenge of local
WG/CCs' expectation of owning their own robust
CE capability (ie, "one base, one boss") must be
addressed
The impact of no organic physician and/or RST
support within a hub-and-spoke-organized CE
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group must be more fully considered
Additional comments (if necessary):
4. The following are additional responses categorized as potential considerations for planning future
expeditionary CE hub-and-spoke organized units. Please review and rate your agreement with these
statements.
Future Considerations
Rating
Comments
Hub-and-spoke-organized CE units should be
considered for support to contingency exercises and
exercise-related construction requirements
When hub-and-spoke unit is leveraging both Prime
BEEF and RED HORSE capabilities, it would be
best to ensure the group commander (usually an O-6)
has had operational RH experience prior to assuming
command of the group
Additional comments (if necessary):
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Appendix C. AFIT Human Subjects Exemption Approval (Phase One)
'

•

,

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLO GY
WRIGHT-P ATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE OH IO

19 Nov 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR OR. TA Y W. JOHANNES
FROM: JciTrey A. O~tdcn, Ph.D.
A FIT IRB Research Rev iewer
2950 Hobson Way
Wright-Pancrson AFB, OH 45433-7765
SUBJECT: Approval for exemption request !'rom human experiment ation requiremen ts (32 CFR
219, DoDO 3216.2 and AFJ 40-402) lbr PACAF CE Hub and Spoke.
I. Your request was based on the Code of Federal Regulmions, title 32. part 219, section 101,
paragraph (b) (2) Research activities that involve the usc of educationa l tests (cognitive,
diagnostic, aptitude, achievemen t), survey procedures, interview procedures, or observation of
public behavior unless: (i) Information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human
subjects can be identilie<L directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (i i) Any
disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the
snhjects at ri sk of criminal or ci vil liabili ty or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing,
employability, or reputation.
2. Your study quali fies for this exemption because you arc not collecting sensitive data, whic h
could reasonably damage the subjects' tlnancia l standing, employabil ity, or reputation. Further,
you are not collecting any demographic data which could realisticall y be expected to map a
given response to a specific subject.
3. ·n1is detenninati on pertains onl y to the Federal , Department ofDc(cnse , and Ai r Force
regulations that govern the use of human subjects in research. Further, if a subject's future
response reasonably places them at risk of criminal or civil liabili ty or is damaging to their
linancial standing, employability. or reputation, you arc required to file an adverse event report
~
with this office immed iately.

JI!P
AFI
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Appendix D. AFIT Human Subjects Exemption Approval (Phase Two)

DEPA RTM ENT OF T HE A IR F ORCE
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
W RIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE OHIO

25 January 2013
MEMORANDUM FOR LT COL TAY JOHANNES
FROM: Williant A. Cunningham, Ph.D.
AFIT IRB Research Reviewer
2950 Hobson Way
Wright-PattersonAFB, OH 45433-7765
SUBJECT: Approval for exemption request from hurnan experimentation requirentents (32 CFR
219, DoDD 3216.2 and AFI 40-402) for student research PACAF CE Hub and Spoke.
1. Your request was based on the Code of Federal Regulations, title 32, part 219, section 101,
paragraph (b) (2) ResearCh activities that involve tlle use of educational tests (cognitive,
diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures, or observation of
public behavior unless: (i) Infomtation obtained is recorded in such a manner that hurnan
subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) Any
disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the
subjects at risk of crinlinal or civil liability or be dantaging to the subjects' financial standing,
employability, or reputation.

2 . Your study qualifies for this exemption because you are not collecting sensitive data, which
cotdd reasonably damage the subjects' financial standing, entployability, or reputation. Further,
the demographic data you are collecting and the way that you plan to report it cannot realistically
be expected to map a given response to a specific subject.
3. This detemlination pertains only to the Federal, Department of Defense, and Air Force
regulations that govern the use of human subjects in research. Further, if a subject's fttture
response reasonably places them at risk of crinlinal or civil liability or is damaging to their
finmcial standing, employability, or reputation, you are required to file an adverse event report
wilh this office inlmediately.
//signedf/
WILLIAM A. CUNNINGHAM, PH.D.
AFIT Research Reviewer
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